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THE WORKER AND THREE PHASES OF UNIONISM:
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF THE WORKER-UNION RELATIONSHIP

Alfred W. Blumrosen*
"[T]he organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever increasing
might and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set our faces against
this tendency." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1896).1

emerged in the American industrial society to protect the economic and dignitary interests of employees. The
national labor policy, developed in the 1930's, allowed employees
to use their collective strength, channelled and developed through
unions, to counter the power of the employers. In this process,
the power of the labor union as an organization was enhanced.
This increasing power over the economic destiny of employees has
created problems not widely envisioned a generation ago.2 For
union power can be exercised not only against the employer, but
in cooperation with him; not only for the employees, but against
them.
The union affects employees in its performance of three somewhat different functions in our social-economic-political life. First,
it affects them while it is engaged as a pressure group, asserting legislative demands in the name of the workers, in the national, state
and local political arenas. Secondly, the union affects employees

U
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• Professor of Law, Rutgers University.-Ed.
1 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (dissent).
2 The legislation establishing the framework of labor relations law is discussed
throughout the text. For a general background, see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw (2d
rev. ed. 1958). The various statutes and agencies referred to are as follows:
The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C §§ 153, 158-60 (Supp. IV, 1963). It was
amended and supplemented in 1947 in Title I of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C §§ 153, 158-60 (Supp. IV,
1963). This statute is hereinafter referred to and cited as the NLRA. Its provisions are
administered by the five-member National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred
to as the NLRB.
The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C §§ 153, 158-60, 186-87 (Supp.
IV, 1963), embraces the amendments to the NLRA, and several other new statutory
features. It is hereinafter referred to and cited as the LMRA.
The Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 54 Stat. 785 (1940), 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-63 (1958), hereinafter referred to as the RLA. It created bodies consisting of
equal representatives of unions and employers, known as Railway Adjustment Boards,
referred to hereinafter as RAB. It also creates the National Mediation Board, hereinafter
referred to as NMB.
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), 73
Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV, 1963) hereinafter referred to as the
LMRDA.
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who are caught up in internal union politics. The union may be
a battleground of personalities and economic issues which are in
constant political turmoil. Thirdly, the union affects employees
as it performs its economic function in the collective bargaining
process, making day-to-day decisions in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements.
This article will examine the extent to which, and the methods
by which, individual rights are protected in each of these three
phases of union activity. We will see that the employee is well protected in his right to oppose political action of the union and has
considerable legal protection for his rights to engage in internal
union political struggles, but the employee has received little protection for his economic interests in collective bargaining between
unions and employers. A recent decision by the NLRB, which will
be examined in some detail, suggests that additional protection for
individual economic rights in the collective bargaining process
may be in the offing.
The evaluation of legal relations between union and worker
in each of these three contexts must be tentative because the social,
economic and technological foundation of the union-member relationship is undergoing constant change. Our society is moving
in the direction of greater organization of economic activity,
whether in private or governmental hands. In such a society,
traditional concepts of civil liberties will be inadequate to preserve individual freedom. Civil liberties have been defined as limitations on the power of government over individuals. This concept
does not protect the individual, either member or non-member,
against the powerful associations which dominate our society.
There has been little development of the concept of individual
freedom in the context of group activity.3 This failure may be
3 An early modem law review study, well worth reading today, is Jaffe, Law Making
by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937). Other writings which deal with the
general problem of the role of the powerful group in modem society include: HoRN,
GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956); HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 300-01 (1960); KA.RIEL, THE DECLINE OF All[£RICAN PLURALISlll chs. 1-9 (1961);
MILLER, PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1959); PRESTOS, THE ORGANIZA•
TIONAL SOCIETY (1962); Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Pro•
tection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
933 (1952); Blumrosen, Union-Management Agreements Which Harm Others, 10 J.
PUB. L. 345 (1961); Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L. REv. 331 (1958); Friedmann, Cor•
porate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 155 (1957);
Symposium, Group Interests and the Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 429 (1959); Wirtz, Govern•
ment by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REv. 440 (1953).
Cases which deal with critical aspects of the relation of member to group include:
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
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most serious. In the organized society, individual freedom which
is not protected against group power will lose much of its meaning.
Unions themselves provide a study in ambivalence on the
question of individual rights. On the one hand, they are organized
in accordance with the principle of centralized power. The authority of the union stems from the union's constitutional convention
and is delegated outward.4 But at the same time, the union seeks
to act as the democratic interpreter of the interests of the employees. 5
The necessity of applying basic values concerning freedom and
power to the relation between individual and group has been
recognized in those cases which apply due process and equal protection concepts to some of the activities of some of the more
strategically located groups in the nation. 6 This, however, has not
been the direction in which the law of union-worker relations has
developed. The rules concerning this relationship are developing
on other than constitutional grounds. Consequently, the relationship provides a laboratory in which the law relating to the individual and the group may consciously be tested and developed. In
this crucible, we may seek meaningful individual freedom as the
organized society becomes a reality.
The law with which we are concerned is of recent vintage,
without the sanctity of age or the certainty of experience. Recent
judicial decisions control the relation between union and worker
in the political context. In the area of internal union affairs, the
basic law was enacted in 1959. In the collective bargaining area,
judicial decisions going back less than twenty years establish the
principles governing the relationship. This suggests that the problems are those of contemporary society, and that, for this reason
367 U.S. 740 (1961); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944);
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1962); Raymond v.
Creger, 38 N.J. 472, 185 A.2d 856 (1962).
See LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY (1959).
To state the conflict in this manner is not to suggest that all problems of union•
worker relations are dealt with similarly by any given union at any given time. The
complexities involved in the relationship between the organization and its members
are far too intricate for such a simple characterization. See ETZioNI, A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF Cm,IPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (1961), for a discussion of some of these complexities. See also LIPSE'f, TROW &: COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1956). Nevertheless,
for purposes of analysis of legal doctrine it is necessary to simplify the institutional
problems into types of situations. No harm is done if we recognize that the intricacies
of each situation will assert themselves on concrete occasions.
6 St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal
Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961).
4

5
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also, the area provides an opportunity for wise legal development on all fronts-legislative, administrative and judicial.
To put the clash of individual freedom and group power into
a proper perspective, it should be noted that the union and its
members are not usually in opposition. On most matters, most
of the time, the member agrees with or accepts the union's action.
As a result, the member's interest can generally be best expressed
by giving full scope to union power. The focus of this study is
the worker who opposes the union, not because of the number of
such cases, but, rather, because his case sharply presents the potential conflict between individual freedom and group power.

I.

THE POLITICAL SPHERE

"The notion that economic and political concerns are separable is pre-Victorian
. . . . It is not true in life that political protection is irrelevant to, and insulated from, economic interests. It is not true for industry or finance. Neither
is it true for labor." Justice Felix Frankfurter (1961).7

In recent years unions have moved with increasing confidence
between the bargaining table and the legislative halls. Their lobbying activities on almost all legislative matters are well known.
When legislation concerning the permissible scope of union economic power comes before Congress, unions mass their political
strength to preserve and expand their freedom to use economic
pressure in collective bargaining. The interrelationship between
union economic activity and union political action is obvious and
intense.
As government takes a greater interest in collective bargaining
activities, its attitude becomes more important. This attitude will
inevitably be affected by political considerations. Continued political action thus is essential to the continued ability of the union
to function in the economic area. Therefore, the union must
muster all possible organizational strength in key political struggles. Inevitably, some members will disagree with the union position on the issues which emerge. The question then arises as
to the extent to which the union may publicly and formally
compel conformity with its political views.

A. Expulsion for Political Action
The power of a union to expel a member who takes a position
antagonistic to its political interest was denied in Mitchell v.
7 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 814-15 (1961) (dissent).
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International Ass'n of Machinists, 8 a case recently decided in
California. In that case, Mitchell and Mulgrew had been employed by Lockheed Aircraft for seventeen and six years respectively when they were expelled from the union because of their
vigorous public campaign in support of a proposed state right-towork law. Union leadership in California, as elsewhere, viewed the
right-to-work laws as a serious threat to union strength. The union
had publicly opposed such laws and was undoubtedly embarrassed
by the contrary activities of these two long-time union members.
After the right-to-work law had been defeated in the 1958 election, 0 Mitchell and Mulgrew were tried by the union for conduct
unbecoming union members, found guilty, and expelled. They
did not, however, lose their jobs.10 The California District Court
of Appeals, per Justice Fox, set aside the expulsion.
In his opinion, Justice Fox recognized that a union is not a
social club entitled to the kind of minimal judicial supervision
which the pre-existing common law had accorded "private voluntary associations." A large part of a union's power and authority
is derived from its recognition, under federal legislation, as an
exclusive bargaining agent. "Further, [unions] are not primarily
social groups which require homogeneous views in order to retain
smooth functioning. They are large, heterogeneous groups, whose
members may agree on one thing only-they want improved working conditions and greater economic benefi.ts."11
Additionally, the plaintiffs had a valuable interest to protect
in their union membership, even though they had not been discharged as a result of the expulsion. Lack of union membership
might make it more difficult to get other jobs, the union might
have built up funds in which they could participate only as members, and the union might not represent all of the employees
adequately in dealing with management.
While the union may expel members for activity directly
related to collective bargaining, such as serving as labor spies or
violating no-strike clauses, when the cause for expulsion relates
to the political action of the members, Justice Fox identified a
196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961).
o In the 1958 elections, right-to-work laws were rejected by voters in five of the six
jurisdictions in which they were proposed. See the full discussion in Sultan, The Union
Security Issue, in PUBLIC POLICY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 88 (Shister, Aaron &: Summers
ed. 1962).
10 For a report of the aftermath of the litigation, see N.Y. Times, July 29, 1962, p. 60,
cols. 3-4.
11 196 Cal. App. 2d at 799, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
8
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public interest. "[U]nlimited freedom to express political views is
the very heart of a democratic body, pumping the life blood of
ideas without which our system could not survive." 12
The public interest in the free expression of ideas, together
with the individual's right to speak freely on political matters,
was held to outweigh the union's interest in presenting a unified
political front on the issue. It is unlikely that the court which
decided Mitchell would allow expulsion because of a member's
position on any political issue, including the repeal of the basic
labor legislation. The public and individual interest in free political debate increases in direct relation to the union's interest in
unanimity of political support.
Justice Fox supported his decision with a footnote reference
to the California Labor Code which prohibits employer discrimination against an employee because of his political views or
activities.13 California is one of the few jurisdictions in the nation
which legislatively protects the employee against political demands
made by the employer. In most jurisdictions, it is possible for the
employer to demand political allegiance of the employee as the
price of continued employment. 14 The social interest in freedom
of political debate has been generally subordinated to the employer's interest in securing political conformity.
In light of the decision in this case, the privilege of the employer to require political conformity of his employees is open
to re-examination. There is no reason to allow the employer to
demand political conformity of the employee if the union is not
free to take the same action. In the past, the courts assumed
that employer action reflected the social interest, but union action did not. Employers were permitted to act in antisocial ways
toward their employees, but unions were not. 15 The labor legisId. at 804, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
Id. at 807 n.7, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 820 n.7.
See Annot., Discharge from Private Employment on Ground of Political Views or
Conduct, 51 A.L.R.2d 742 (1957).
15 See Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 350-51. Employers have been held entitled to
discharge employees in the following cases: Odell v. Humble Oil &: Ref. Co., 201 F.2d
123 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953) (for giving truthful testimony while
under government subpoena in an antitrust suit against employer); Christy v. Petrus,
365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956) (for filing workmen's compensation claims); Bell
v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (for refusing to vote as employer directed).
On the other hand, unions have been prohibited from penalizing members in the
following instances: Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), 14 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 624 (1960) (for giving of truthful testimony
before legislative committees); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, Bhd. of R.R.
Trainmen, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921) (same); Burke v. Monumental Div. No. 52,
12
13
14
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lation of the past thirty years has destroyed any basis which may
have existed for this distinction between unions and employers,
and requires that they be treated similarly. Otherwise, what appears to be enhanced individual freedom may be no more than a
disguised judicial preference for employer, rather than union,
political pressures on the worker.
By emphasizing the social importance of individual participation in political activities, the courts lay a foundation for political
freedom of the employee not only against the union, but also
against his own employer. Freedom to engage in political activity
without retaliation is equally important in the employer-employee
relation. This aspect of the Mitchell case has considerable growth
potential. The right of employers to discharge for antisocial
reasons, like the right of the union to expel, is a judicial invention
which can be judicially modified.16
In Mitchell the court interpolated values found in the Constitution and in democratic political theory into the relation of
individual to union. This was a legitimate exercise of the judicial
law-making function. The same result is suggested, if not impelled,
by the language of section l0l(a)(2) of the LMRDA.17 Thus, both
judicial decision and legislative determination have protected the
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 273 Fed. 707 (D. Md. 1919) (for bringing suit against the
union in connection with its decision to call a strike); Schneider v. Local 60, United
Journeymen, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905) (for refusing to follow union suggestions
while in an official position). For a criticism of these cases giving unlimited freedom
to the employer, see Blumrosen, The Right To Seek Workmen's Compensation, 15
RUTGERS L. REv. 491 (1961). The decision in Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
supra, was adhered to, after trial, resulting in a $50,000 verdict. 53 L.R.R.M. 2105 (Cal.
App. 1963).
16 The principle that an employment contract is presumed to be at will unless the
contrary is clearly disclosed was first stated in a legal treatise. ·wooD, MASTER AND SERVANT,
§ 134 (1877). It was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Martin v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895), and spread rapidly. For a collection of
materials dealing with the development of this doctrine, see BLUIIIROSEN, MATERLU.S
AND CASES ON THE LAw OF THE EIIIPLOYJIIENT RELATION 190-205 (multilith 1962).
17 This section reads: "Every member of any labor organization shall have the right
to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments,
or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the
meeting." Commas originally followed the words "members" and "opinions."
The semicolon after the word "members" was introduced in the following exchange
on the floor of the Senate, 105 CONG. REc. 6718 (1959); II LEGISLATIVE HISrORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1230 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as 1959 ACT LEGIS. HISr.]:
"Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I suggest an amendment, in this part of the amendment, by inserting a semicolon after the word 'members' on line 9 of page 2 of the
amendment. That is simply a clerical change. There ought to be no objection to that
modification.
"Mr. KucHEL. There will not be any objection, and I accept the amendment. . . .
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political rights of union members against discriminatory retaliation by the union.
B. Political Use of Union Dues

Although the dissenter may not be expelled for his political
beliefs, may the union use his dues to support political causes
with which he disagrees? The earlier view was that the member
was bound by the majority decision concerning the use to which
union dues would be put.18 The present position of the Supreme
Court is to the contrary. The leading case is International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street, 19 which arose under the Railway Labor
Act. The issue was whether dues collec;ted under a union-shop
agreement could be used for political purposes over the objection
of a union member. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against enforcement of the union-shop agreement rather than against the
allegedly improper use of the dues. This raised the question of
whether the complainants were seeking to get rid of the baby
rather than the bath-seeking to undermine the union-shop agree"Mr. CooPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
"Mr. KucHEL. I yield to the able Senator from Kentucky, a distinguished co-author
of the amendment.
"Mr. CooPER. I wish to call my question to the attention of the Senator from Arkansas.
I think it is wise to make some legislative history on the point. I assume the purpose
of placing a semicolon at that point, is to assure, if there is any question about it, that
the constitutional safeguards of free speech shall be preserved outside the union hall.
"Mr McCLELLAN. The purpose is to make certain that union members shall have
freedom of speech not only in a union hall, but outside.
"Mr. KUCHEL. I agree."
A few moments after this exchange, Senator McClellan rose to indicate that the
semicolon added had been misplaced. He sought, and received, unanimous consent to
place it after the word "opinion" instead of after the word "members." 105 CONG. REc.
6722 (1959); II 1959 Acr LEGIS. HIST. 1234. This revision was copied into H.R. 8432,
as it was engrossed in the House, 105 CoNG. REc. 15883 (1959); II 1959 Acr LEGIS. HIST,
1693.
The original language, using commas after the two words, suggested that the statute
protected freedom to communicate with fellow union members. Inserting a semicolon
after the word "members," as was originally done, could give rise to the argument that
the expression of opinion was protected regardless of the composition of the audience,
However, when the semicolon was moved to the end of the word "opinions," it sug•
gested again that the communication protected by the act involved other union members.
The decision to use semicolons in both places was apparently made by the draftsman of
the Landrum-Griffin bill, H.R. 8400. It is there, without explanation, that the double
use of the semicolons first appears. The result of all this is that it is possible to argue
either that expression of views to the general public is protected, which would confirm
the result of the Mitchell case, or that only expression directed to other union members
is protected. Senator McClellan's statement does not solve the problem. At times, one
becomes skeptical of the utility of the process of tracing legislative history at least on
such matters as punctuation.

1s DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 175 P.2d 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1946), afj'd, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 906 (1948).
19 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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ment as inconsistent with the political rights of the union members.20
If the plaintiffs had hoped to upset the union shop in the name
of political liberty, they were disappointed. The Supreme Court
sustained the validity of the union-shop agreement. 21 At the
same time, it held that the dues of the dissidents could not be
used over their objection for political purposes. The Court tailored a remedy to fit the employees' claim. Their dues were to
be divided in accordance with the proportion of dues spent by
the union for political purposes. Plaintiffs were entitled to a refund of that portion of their dues, or to an injunction against
the expenditure thereof, by the union.22
Seven Justices concluded that Congress either had not permitted, or could not constitutionally permit, the union to spend
dues for political purposes over the objection of a member.
Justices Douglas and Black argued that, since the association
of member and union was coerced by a combination of the "facts
of life" and congressional authorization, the union could not
constitutionally use the dues of dissenters for political purposes.
Such use of these funds was inconsistent with their political freedom under the first amendment. Constitutional standards were
20 This was Professor Aaron's view of the case as it reached the Supreme Court.
"Stripped of all its disguises, the Street case thus emerges as simply another attack on
the validity of the union shop; and the issues it raises are neither novel nor particularly
significant." Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 Omo
ST. L.J. 39, 63 (1961).
21 This decision reaffirmed the holding in Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225 (1956), that authorization of a union-shop provision was within the scope of
congressional judgment permitted by the fifth amendment.
22 Mr. Justice Whittaker agreed with the decision but dissented from what he conceived to be an ineffective remedy. He would have enjoined enforcement of the unionshop agreement. Mr. Justice Douglas, who believed the union-shop requirement unconstitutional as applied to the political dissenter, joined the majority to provide a
decision on the remedy. On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to dismiss
the action although the union offered to make a full refund of all dues to the plaintiffs
in the case. That court remanded to the trial court so that the latter could formulate
an appropriate remedy to protect the dissidents via either a reduction in dues or a
refund. If the trial court was unable to develop a practical remedy, it was to enjoin
the union from e.'\'.pending any funds for political purposes. 217 Ga. 351, 122 S.E.2d
220 (1961). This proposed remedy is clearly inconsistent with the views of the Supreme
Court in Street. See 367 U.S. at 773. See also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
In Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 83 Sup. Ct. Il58 (1963), the Supreme Court
held that an injunction against the enforcement of the union-shop agreement was not
a proper remedy to enforce the right recognized in Street. The Court elaborated on the
the remedial problems involved in the Street decision, holding (1) that the employee
is entitled to a refund of all dues which have been spent for any political purpose if
he makes timely objection to the expenditure without specifying the particular political
use to which he objects, and (2) that relief should consist of a refund of the proportion
of the dues which reflects the proportion of political expenditures to total union
expenditures, and a reduction of future dues by the same proportion.
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applicable because the funds were collected under federal statutory authorization.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, on the other hand, concluded
that the connection between governmental and union action was
"too fine spun" to justify application of the constitutional standards to the use of dues. Congress had merely p~rmitted, but not
required, the union-shop agreement. Therefore, constitutional
standards were not applicable, even if the political use of dues of
dissenters could be viewed as an infringement on their political
freedom. 23
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for five members of the Court,
avoided the constitutional question. He concluded that Congress
had not intended to allow the union to make political use of the
dues of dissident members. The legislative history of the 1951
amendment to the RLA, which permitted the union-shop agreement, did not demonstrate that the dues of dissenters collected
under such agreements could be used for political purposes. Since
Congress had been concerned with the rights of dissenters, and had
not expressed an intention to override their political liberties,
the statute should not be construed so as to authorize a union
to use dues collected thereunder for political purposes over the
objection of a member.
This opinion was criticized by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan on the ground that Mr. Justice Brennan asked the wrong question of the legislative history. Union political activity was so well
known-especially to congressmen who bear the brunt of it-that
its continuance under union-shop agreements probably was assumed by the legislators. The burden of demonstration from legislative history should have been imposed on those who claimed that
Congress had not authorized the political use of the dues of dissenters. This criticism is unwarranted. Mr. Justice Brennan demonstrated judicial statesmanship of high order when he placed the
burden of demonstration on those who wished to justify the restraint on political freedom involved in the Street case. His approach simultaneously adjusted two sets of important relationships
23 For a discussion supporting the Black-Douglas position and opposing that taken
by Frankfurter-Harlan on the constitutional question, see Blumrosen, Significant Supreme

Court Decisions Affecting Labor Relations, 1960 Term; Herein of Political Use of Union
Dues and of Hiring Halls, 16 Sw. L.J. 57, 59-61 (1962). For the opposite view, see Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345
(1961); Wellington, Machinists v. Street; Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of
Constitutional Issues, 1961 SUPREME CouRT REv. 49.
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which converged in Street-the relation between Court and Congress, and the relation between union and member.
C.

Judicial Protection of Constitutional Rights
on Statutory Grounds

Judicial control of labor legislation on constitutional grounds
has not proved satisfactory. Early in this century, economic predilections led the Supreme Court to invalidate legislative efforts
to regulate labor relations, but the Court overturned these decisions during the 1930's and the 1940's.24 But then the Court began
its surveillance of state regulation of picketing under the first
and fourteenth amendments. By 1957 this approach had withered
while another basis for restriction, the pre-emption doctrine,
emerged to limit state action. 25
This rather rapid revision in constitutional law approaches is
rooted in changing economic and social facts, and in the shifting
attitudes of the country and the Court. Yet, constitutional decisions under the first amendment and due process clauses seek to
identify and implement the more permanent values in our system,
as distinct from those which are merely transitory. To the extent
that these decisions are given only passing deference by the Supreme Court, their authority is diluted and the protection afforded
these important values is jeopardized. At the same time, such
decisions create rigidities in the lower courts which are not easily
modified.
As our society becomes more highly organized, constitutional
decisions which appear well founded by today's standards may inhibit or delay important social developments, or fail to protect
important freedoms. To avoid this, the Court must seek techniques
24 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), and Adair v. United -'tates, 208 U.S. 161 (1908),
which invalidated on constitutional grounds legislative attempts to restrict employer
anti-union conduct, were distinguished, and finally discarded in Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron &: Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). The Lincoln decision also
interred the case of Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522
(1923), which had invalidated a system of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.
See Rodes, Due Process and Social Legislation in the Supreme Court-A Post Mortem,
33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 5 (1957).
25 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), enveloped picketing in the "preferred
position" given free speech under then current constitutional law doctrines under the
first and fourteenth amendments. This protection was virtually eliminated in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
The decline in regulation of state limitations on picketing was accompanied by an
increase in restraint of state action under the pre-emption doctrine. See Blumrosen,
The New Federalism in Labor Law, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Acr OF 1959 (Slovenko ed. 1960).
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to accomplish two seemingly inconsistent objectives: the preservation of the values implicit in constitutional principles, and the
avoidance of rigidities which often flow from constitutional adjudication. Both of these objectives are served when the Court
interpolates the values protected by constitutional guarantee into
the construction of statutes. The process of "construction to avoid
a constitutional question" which protects the asserted constitutional claim is a valuable judicial technique. It might better be
· termed "construction to protect constitutional values." It preserves
the values protected by the Constitution, but leaves the legislature
free to overrule the decision. If the legislature directly rejects the
Court's judgment on the issues involved, the process of construction may be repeated, or the constitutional issue may be faced by
the Court. But, in the interim, the legislative branch will have
spoken directly on the issue which the Court had faced. This
legislative judgment will weigh importantly in the ultimate judicial decision on the constitutional question.
Labor relations law provides several illustrations of the successful use of the technique of construction to protect constitutional
values. The Virginia Electric & Power Co. 26 case, requiring that
employer unfair labor practices be construed in accordance with
first amendment protection of freedom of speech, and the Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.21 case both illustrate this point.
In the Steele case the Court interpreted the Railway Labor Act
as requiring the union which acted as bargaining agent to represent
all the employees fairly. The requirement was not explicit in the
statute, but the Court found it implied through (1) the use of the
term "representative," (2) a "principle of general application"
that powers are to be exercised in behalf of their beneficiaries, and
(3) an analogy of the union to the legislature and the application
of standards of due process and equal protection associated with
review of legislation.28
The Court achieved at least as much, and perhaps more, protection for individual employees and minoritfos by this construction as it could have afforded them by holding that the Constitution applied to union action. It also avoided the thorny problems
involved in adopting the concept that union action was governNLRB v. Virginia Elec. &: Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
28 See Givens, Federal Protection of Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29
FORDHAM L. REv. 259 (1960).
20

21
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mental action.29 As a result, the growth potential of the duty of
fair representation remains untested.30 It may ultimately require
the union to admit to participation in union affairs all those whom it
represents. 31 As yet, the duty has not been expressly rejected or limited by Congress. This approach gives more flexibility and versatility
than any direct application of the Constitution to trade unions
could. It is not limited to claims which would rise to the level of
constitutional demands, nor restricted by the amorphous concept
of governmental action. It is a viable mechanism for the regulation
of union action, but at the same time is subject to congressional
review. It is a good illustration of the infusion of constitutional
values into the process of statutory construction.
The saving of congressional power to review and reverse the
Court assures that the judiciary will not for long frustrate the
legislative judgment on important questions. This is an important
aspect of the technique of construction to preserve constitutional
values. It simultaneously recognizes legislative supremacy and
liberates judicial energy. The Court may be more willing to
protect constitutional values within a legislative context than to
write them "indelibly" into the Constitution. This answers criticisms such as those levelled at the "old" Court that the judiciary,
by interpolating its own views into the Constitution, was improperly hindering legislative developments.
While we normally think of legislation as posing issues for
the courts to decide, the process can and does work fruitfully in
the other direction, with the courts posing issues for legislative
acquiescence or rejection. This interaction between legislative
and judicial process is one of the most important developments
in the art of governing labor relations. It can be carried on only
if the Court avoids the constitutional issue and seeks to root its
decision in the statute.
This, it seems, is what Mr. Justice Brennan did in the Street
case. By asking a deceptively naive question of the legislative
history, he was able, in writing the Court's opinion, to protect
simultaneously the political freedom of the union member and
leave the question of the extent of that freedom in the legislative
!!O On this question, compare Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and
"Governmental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961), with Note, Discrimination in Union
Membership: Denial of Due Process under Federal Collective Bargaining Legislation, 12
RUTGERS L. REV. 543 (1958).
so See Blumrosen, supra note 3, at 358-76, and the discussion in Part III infra.
31 Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 Omo
ST. L.J. 21 (1961).
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domain. The burden has been placed upon those who would
weaken individual freedom to secure legislation to achieve that
result. In short, Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion reflects a basic
sympathy with the attitude of Justices Black and Douglas on the
question of individual freedom, coupled wiµi an unwillingness
to fetter the legislature with a decision based on constitutional
grounds.
D.

Union-Member Relations

The Street decision bodes well for maximization of individual
freedom against and within the group in the organized society.
These groups have demonstrated little interest in protecting their
members from themselves, save for the enlightened example of the
United Automobile Workers' Public Review Board.32 More likely,
the groups will seek legislative action which will increase their
power over their members. However, legislation which destroys or
overtly minimizes individual freedoms will not gain popular support. Individualism is still the language of national political debate, even if the facts of associational life have rendered the concept less meaningful. The result is that the legislature is usually
immobilized on the issue of individual versus group. Therefore,
the decisions of the courts, either under the common law or in the
interpretation of statutes, have more than transient significance.
In the main, if the courts protect freedoms, the protection will
stand. If they do not, then the freedoms will receive no legal
protection. If the Court had held in Street that the dues of the
dissenters could be used for political purposes, that would have
ended the matter. The present decision, which for practical purposes is also final, ends the matter by protecting individual freedom
against all but explicit-and unlikely-legislative restriction.
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the unions will face
serious financial problems as a result of the decision. Most union
members are sufficiently aware of the correlation between union
political activity and the effectiveness of the union as an economic
force so that they will continue to pay their dues and allow them
to be used for political purposes. In fact, the unions may gain
because the dissenters have an opportunity to withdraw their
dues, in that the unions can make a more genuine claim to repre32 See STIEBER, OBERER

& HARRINGTON, DEMOCRACY

AND PUBLIC

R£vmw (1961); Brooks,

Impartial Public Review of Internal Union Disputes: Experiment in Democratic Self·
Discipline, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 64 (1961); Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Rei•iew of Labor:
Some Reflections, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 55 (1959).
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senting the authentic political voice of those workers who have
not withdrawn their dues. Additionally, it is not easy for the dissenter to withdraw his dues. He must personally claim a refund.
The device of class actions proposed in Street was rejected. Thus,
only the dissenter with the courage of his conviction will gain by
the decision.
Mr. Justice Brennan's conclusion in the Street case is supportable by reference to still other considerations. In 1947, Congress
prohibited a labor union from making any "contribution or expenditure" in connection with elections which are subject to
congressional regulation. 33 This statute clearly reflects the desire
of Congress that union funds not be spent for political purposes.
Mr. Justice Brennan might have supported his interpretation of
the union-shop provisions of the RLA by construing them in light
of this announced legislative policy disfavoring union political
activity.
Of course, the constitutionality of the 1947 provision restricting union political activity is quite doubtful. 34 Perhaps this is
why Mr. Justice Brennan did not utilize the statute as a manifestation of congressional policy.35 Even if the provision is unconstitutional, however, it suggests the direction of congressional thinking
about unions and politics. Mr. Justice Brennan may have correctly
reconciled congressional policies which simultaneously recognized
the legitimacy of the union shop and sought to minimize the
union's financial participation in politics.
Ironically, if we conclude that the dues of the dissenters may
not be used for political purposes over their objection, it is clear
that the 1947 statute limiting the political activities of unions is
an unconstitutional invasion of the right to associate for political
purposes. The dues used for political purposes become, in a meaningful sense, "voluntary contributions" since the members have
an option to prevent such use. Consequently, it seems clearly beyond the power of Congress to restrain individuals from making
33 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 62 Stat. 723 (1948), as amended, 63 Stat. 90 (1949),
a~ amended, 65 Stat. 718 (1951), 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958). See Lane, Political Expenditures
by Labor Unions, 9 LAB. L.J. 725 (1958), for a discussion of the course of litigation under
this statute and its predecessors.
34 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
35 Mr. Justice Brennan did indicate, in 367 U.S. at 773 n.21, that "no contention was
made below or here that any of the expenditures involved in this case were made in
violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 •.. or any state corrupt
practices legislation."
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such contributions for political purposes through their associations.36
Three elements-protection of constitutional yalues on nonconstitutional grounds, implementation of a legislative policy
restricting the political activity of labor organizations expressed
in the Taft-Hartley Act, and certain expressions in the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act37-suggest that the Street doctrine
is not limited to cases arising under the Railway Labor Act, but
is equally applicable to union-shop agreements under the National
Labor Relations Act.38 Thus, the decision protects the right of
political dissent in all areas regulated by federal labor legislation.
86 See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). A six-to-three majority refused
to pass on the constitutionality of the 1947 legislation. Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated
issues which might be relevant on the question of constitutionality. One of these issues
was whether the funds may "be fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis."
The answer to this question, in the light of the Street decision, is in the affirmative,
since the dissident can withdraw his support from undesired political activities.
Justices "\\Tarren, Black. and Douglas dissented, on the ground that the statute was
an invasion of freedom of expression guaranteed by the first amendment.
In view of the Street decision, it would appear that the legislation violates the
individual rights of the contributors. Hence, it would not be necessary to consider the
additional proposition, relied on by the dissent in the UAW case, that the statute
also improperly infringes on the rights of the association, qua association, to engage
in political activity. On this question in general, see HoRN, op. cit. supra note 3.
87 Senator Ellender, a supporter of the abolition of the closed shop, indicated that
he wanted to avoid the result in the case of DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists,
31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 906 (1948), in which a union
member who refused to contribute to a political cause in which he did not believe was
ousted from the union and prevented from working. See 93 CoNG. REc. 4138 (1947);
II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 1061 (1948).
Senator Taft, sponsor of the act, justified retention of the permission for the unionshop agreement on the ground that it prevented "free riders." He said: "[W]hat we do,
in effect, is say that no one can get a free ride in such a shop. That meets one of the
arguments for the union shop. The employee has to pay the union dues." 93 CoNG. REc.
3837 (1947); II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF' 1947,
at 1010 (1948). The reference to the avoidance of a "free ride" suggests that the union
shop was designed to compel payment for collective bargaining activities about as
forcefully as do similar references in the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act
union-shop amendment relied on by the majority in Street.
38 Wellington, in Machinists v. Street; Statutory Interpretation and the .Avoidance of
Constitutional Issues, 1961 SUPREME CoURT REv. 49, concludes that the Street decision
is inapplicable to the NLRA's union-shop provision because under the NLRA, as distinguished from the RLA, Congress was not cutting back on the freedom given to
dissenting employees, and the unions regulated under the NLRA have been interested
in union security. Id. at 70.
However, the materials cited in note 37 supra suggest that, on the level of legislative
history, an argument analogous to that advanced in Street can be made. More importantly, if the consideration~ discussed in the text supply the basis for the Street
decision, they are equally applicable under the NLRA. Hence, the decision is properly
treated as final under the present federal labor legislation, both under the RLA and the
NLRA.
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INTERNAL AFFAIRS

"[T]raditionally democratic means of improving their union may be freely
availed of by members without fear of harm or penalty. And this necessarily
includes the right to criticize current union leadership and, within the union,
to oppose such leadership and its policies..•• The price of free expression and
of political opposition within a union cannot be the risk of expulsion or other
disciplinary ai;tion. In the final analysis, a labor union profits, as does any
democratic body, more by permitting free expression and free political opposi•
tion than it may ever lose from any disunity that it may thus evidence." Judge
Stanley H. Fuld (1958).39

Prior to 1959, legal protection for the union member's right
to engage in political activity within the union had been developed by the courts in a series of cases dealing with the expulsion
of members. The theories with which the courts regulated the
internal political affairs of unions-contract, property, natural
justice or public policy-were discussed with devastating clarity by
Professor Chafee in his classic article in the Harvard Law Review
in 1930.40 To him, the underlying basis for judicial interference
in union affairs was not expressed by any of these doctrines.
"The member's relation to the association is the true subject
matter of protection in most cases where relief is given against
wrongful expulsions. The wrong is a tort, not a breach of
contract, and the tort consists in the destruction of the relation rather than in a deprivation of the remote and conjectural right to receive property."41
The application ·of common-law principles relating to private associations to the union-member relationship has been ably charted
by Professor Summers.42 By 1958, the courts had finally articulated
the policies which had led them to protect the union-member relationship in connection with internal union politics. The key decision was Madden v. Atkins,43 with the quotation that appears at the
beginning of this section. The New York Court of Appeals held in
Madden that the union member had a right, protected by the law
of torts, to engage in political activity within the union. A scant
year later, the problems of fitting common-law principles to the
30

Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 293, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 640

(1958).
40 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv. 993
(1930).
41 Id. at 1007.
42 Summers, Legal Limitation on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1951);
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J.
175 (1960).
43 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d '73, 1'74 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958). See Summers, The Law of
Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, '70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960).
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new economic institution of unionism were submerged by the
adoption of far-reaching federal legislation. Titles I to VI of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195944 (hereafter referred to as the LMRDA) regulate, in a mass of detail, many
of the facets of internal union affairs. The rights of individuals to
participate in the political processes of the union are treated by
Titles I and IV of the LMRDA. 45 Title I guarantees to the union
member the right to attend membership meetings, to speak on
subjects relating to union activity without discrimination, to nominate candidates, to vote in elections, and to participate in the
affairs of the union. Title I also protects an individual against
retaliation by the union because he institutes an action in a court
or a proceeding before an administrative agency. It requires that
disciplinary action be taken only upon notice, opportunity to prepare a defense, and full and fair hearing.
Title IV, in dealing with union elections, guarantees the right
of a member to be a candidate and to hold office, and to vote for
and support the candidacy of others. It seeks to insure the regularity of elections, guarantees that the candidate shall have certain
rights to inspect membership lists, to distribute literature by mail
and not to be disadvantaged in connection with costs of the election by the incumbent. Elections are required to be by secret
ballot. Enforcement of the election provisions of the act is vested
in the Secretary of Labor.
The scheme for enforcement and implementation of the legislative policy appears to be all-embracing. But the statute has three
major defects which minimize the protection it affords against
discrimination or retaliation by an antagonistic union leadership.
A. Membership
First, the statute does not entitle all employees represented
by the union to membership. 46 Yet, all such employees are directly
73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV, 1963).
For general discussions of the LMRDA, see Aaron, The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 851, 1086 (1960); Smith, The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REv. 195 (1960).
46 The definition of "member" which determines entitlement to protection of the
act is found in § 3(o), 73 Stat. 520 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402(0) (Supp. IV, 1963).
"Member" or "member in good standing" includes "any person who has fulfilled
the requirements for membership in such organization and [who has not withdrawn or
been properly expelled]." This language was held sufficiently broad to entitle a member
of one local (and the international) to be admitted to another local. Hughes v. Local
11, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961).
But the section has been held not to require the admission of a person with no previous
union connection when one of the "requirements for admission" is a vote by the
44
45
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affected by union decisions in negotiation and administration of
the collective bargaining agreement. Elementary principles of
democratic organization entitle those directly affected by the
union's activities to participate in the formulation of the policies
under which they will work. Notwithstanding this congressional
inaction, the courts may require the union to admit, as to those
aspects of union activities which relate to collective bargaining,
all of the employees who are represented by it. 47 This result cannot, however, be based on the legislation of 1959 which was silent
in regard to the ability of the union to determine its own membership.
B. Candidacy for Union Office
Second, the rights of members to speak and deliberate, discuss
and vote, are guaranteed in Title I of the act, which affords a civil
remedy for violation of these rights in suits brought in a federal
district court. But a key to political participation in the affairs of
the union is the ability to hold union office. The right to be a
candidate is not recognized in Title I at all. It is found only in
Title IV. Title IV is administered by the Secretary of Labor, but
only after an election. The act provides no express protection
against union action prior to an election which improperly excludes a candidate from the ballot or otherwise discriminates
against him. A pre-election challenge to such actions must be
based on the member's right to enforce the constitution and bylaws of the union, a right which existed under state law prior to,
and independent of, federal law. Since the right is defined by
state law, it is subject to no uniform national standards, and
enforced by no administrative agency.
Thus, in regard to the critical period during which the political rights of the union member may be frustrated, the LMRDA's
provisions are silent. This particular gap in the legislation is important. No post-election remedy can make whole a candidate
whose name has been removed from, or prevented from appearing on, the ballot. The vigor of his campaign may have been dissipated in ways beyond repair once the election is over.
Either of two constructions of the statute would partially
correct this defect. If the right to be a candidate were subsumed
membership. Moynahan v. Pari-Mutual Employees Guild, 53 L.R.R.M. 2154 (10th Cir.
1963).
47 See Blumrosen, supra note 31, for a more extensive discussion of this problem.
See also Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUllr.

L. REv. 563 (1962).
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under Title I, a federal district court could protect that right
prior to the election. While the right to be a candidate is conspicuous by its absence from Title I,48 the right to nominate and
vote for a candidate is expressly protected. Since the right to
nominate and vote is hollow if the nominated candidate has been
denied a place on the ballot, this right should be read as including
a right to have the nominee on the ballot. The member, rather
than the candidate, would have to initiate legal action to protect
the candidate's appearance on the ballot, but this scarcely seems
to present a major difficulty.49
A second line of analysis has been developed by Professor
Summers. He argues that Title IV may be fully enforced in
state courts prior to an election, and after the election only by
the Secretary of Labor.50 If his argument were to be adopted, the
objection to the legislation would be obviated. It is difficult, however, to see why Congress would allow only the state courts to act
in this area, since, in virtually all other areas regarding members'
48 The partial overlap between Title I and Title IV has been explored by a number
of courts in suits by disgruntled candidates for union office. The cases decided thus far
suggest that the post-election remedies under Title IV not only foreclose other postelection remedies, but also prevent the district courts from protecting any of the candidates' rights prior to an election under § 102. The courts assume that Title IV gives
all the protection to a candidate that Congress intended, and that the candidate cannot
protect his rights before an election under Title I. See Mamula v. United Steelworkers,
304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962), which discusses the cases.
Mamula involved an attack on an election which had been conducted before the case
was decided by the court of appeals. In a similar case, decided less than a month after
Mamula, the same circuit held that once an election had been conducted, the exclusive
post-election remedies of Title IV foreclosed further judicial action. The court felt that
its opinion "would be advisory and of no immediate consequence to the parties," and
dismissed the case. However, the court reserved the question of "whether a federal court
can grant relief under the Act before an election is held." Colpo v. Highway Truck
Drivers, 305 F.2d 362, 363 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). Colpo thus casts
considerable doubt on the vitality of the decision in Mamula, since it seeks to reserve
judgment on issues which had been previously resolved in Mamula.
49 One of the bases of the decision against the union in Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 198 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. Pa. 1961), was that the procedure involved in selecting
nominees for district director of the union was in violation of the right to nominate a
candidate for union office because the system favored the incumbent officers. The court
of appeals reversed, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962), stating that plaintiff had "ample
opportunity to nominate candidates." Id. at 113. This suggests either that the court
of appeals disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the nomination process
was not meaningful, or that the court of appeals had refused to inquire into the
significance of a nomination if the right to nominate was formally recognized. The
continuing validity of the Mamula decision is questioned in note 48 supra.
The argument that the Title I right to nominate and vote for a candidate includes
the right to have the nominee on the ballot was rejected in Jackson v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 212 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962).
50 summers, Pre-Emption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies,
22 OHIO ST. L.J. 119, 135-40 (1961).
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rights, a federal cause of action was created. For this reason, such
an analysis does not seem convincing.
In any event, the process of interpretation will not provide
the candidate with pre-election protection of as high a quality
as that available under the post-election remedy. Post-election
complaints are handled through the administrative process within
the office of the Department of Labor, while pre-election complaints must be handled through the judicial process, with all
of its limitations in terms of counsel fees, inexpert counsel, judges
unfamiliar with labor relations problems, and the absence of the
informal investigative and settlement procedures available to
administration. Only congressional action vesting pre-election as
well as post-election supervision in the Secretary of Labor can
provide complete protection.

C. Right To Sue
The third weakness in the statutory scheme lies in the complexity of the statutory language relating to the right of the union
member to sue his union. Section 10l(a)(4) provides that a member "may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures
(but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization before instituting legal or administrative proceedings
against such organizations or any officer thereof...."
It has been argued by Solicitor General Cox that Congress, by
the passage of this section, added a statutory requirement of exhaustion of remedies to the existing common-law exhaustion requirement. Under this construction, the statute gives a union the
right to demand compliance with internal procedures for a maximum of four months, at the end of which time a court may
require further exhaustion by reference to the common-law principle. Such a construction reflects more confidence in the internal
review procedures of the union than Congress manifested. 51 It
51 Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 103-06 (1960). The real!Oning which
led Professor Cox to his construction of the section may be set out as follows: (1) The
language of the section refers to union actions which limit the employee's right to
sue, not to the judicial doctrine of exhaustion. Section IO(a)(4), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1963) reads, in relevant part: "(4) Protection of the Right
to Sue.-No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute
an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective
of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such
action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a
witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any
legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member
may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-
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has not been adopted by the courts. They have considered the
statutory exhaustion requirement to be in lieu of the common-law
requirement. The courts may not require the member to exhaust
union remedies for more than four months. 52 The union may require what it will in its constitution, but unless a reasonable
hearing procedure can be followed within four months, exhaustion
is not required. In any event, when four months are up, the statutory exhaustion requirement is satisfied.
The correctness of the courts' view that the statutory exhaustion requirement is in lieu of rather than in addition to the
common-law requirement becomes evident upon a consideration
of the different functions of the common-law and statutory requirements of exhaustion of internal union remedies.
month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative
proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof •••."
Cox's argument has merit insofar as it applies to the introductory sentence of the
statute. But, the language which contains the four-month limitation is found in the first
proviso. This proviso is not clearly directed at either union action or at judicial action.
If it is assumed that the section is directed at union action, it can only be implemented
by the judiciary and may be viewed, as may any law, as a direction to the court not to
honor internal union remedies beyond the four-month period.
(2) The exhaustion doctrine applies in state courts, and it "seems unlikely that
Congress would so lightly sweep aside state rules of judicial administration." Id. at 105.
(Emphasis added.) But Congress was legislating to protect employee access to the courts.
If this access was being unwisely blocked by a judicially invented doctrine of exhaustion,
Congress could limit that doctrine. In any event, Congress was explicitly dealing with
employee rights in the federal courts-see § 102-and is perfectly free to regulate the
federal use of the doctrine of exhaustion. The question of whether the rights secured
by § 101, in an action in the federal courts under § 102, may also be secured by an
action in state courts is one which need not be dealt with when construing § I0I(a)(4).
That problem need only be faced when § 101 is asserted in state courts. The meaning of
§ 101 should be determined without regard to considerations of federal-state relations
since a federal action is contemplated by § 102.
(3) If the section applies to the exhaustion doctrine, perhaps the courts must allow
the union to require exhaustion of internal remedies for four months, regardless of circumstances, and thus may delay access to the NLRB for the purpose of filing charges
under the NLRA. These conclusions lack persuasiveness. The statute uses the permissive may in describing the four-month rule, and the courts can apply their good sense
to the questions of when the rule will be applied and when immediate access to judicial or administrative tribunals will be permitted. There is no reason to assume that
they would read the section as limiting, in any way, employee access to the NLRB.
(4) The application of § 101(a)(4) to the judicial doctrine of exhaustion may overturn
the rule prohibiting employees from suing for breach of the collective bargaining agreement without exhausting contractual remedies, and may either interfere with contracts
which provide that the individual's right is confined to arbitration or upset adjustments
of grievances negotiated by union and employer. This criticism attributes too much
meaning to § 10l(a)(4). The section does not affect other rules of judicial self-restraint
which are rooted in considerations other than those relating to internal union affairs.
It has no direct bearing on the other questions raised by Professor Cox except to suggest, in a most general sense, a more active role for the courts in these matters.
52 The leading case is Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 36_!> U.S. 929 (1961).
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I. The Common-Law Exhaustion Concept
The common-law doctrine requiring the union member to
utilize internal review procedures before seeking equitable relief
against an expulsion was adopted against a background of confusion
as to the basic legal theory regulating the relation of union and
member. 53 The doctrine has been defended on three grounds.54
The first justification is that judicial effort may be conserved in
those cases which can be satisfactorily disposed of by internal
union action. This conservation may, however, be illusory, since,
at common law, the exhaustion requirement was applied only
after the court had heard the merits of the case. 55 Secondly,
it has been contended that the processing of a member's case
within the union might shape the issues and the evidence so as
to enable the court to handle the matter more wisely. But union
procedures are normally so informal that they do not provide a
record of sufficient clarity and definiteness either to shape the issues
or permit a limited scope of judicial review. 56 This leaves only the
third justification, the promotion of the democratic values of selfgovernment and private decision-making, to be considered. This
justification is intimately related to the theory that the unionmember relationship is governed by a contract voluntarily entered
into between union and member. Since the parties have decided by
contract to utilize internal review proceedings before resorting to
courts, this expression of their wishes should be honored.
The attempt to justify the exhaustion doctrine on contract
53 See text at note 40 supra. See also Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1049, 1086-92 (1951); Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2 I.An. L.J. 487 (1951); Annot., Exhaustion of Remedies Within Labor Union as
Condition of Resort to Civil Courts by Expelled or Suspended Member, 168 A.L.R. 1462
(1947); Note, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE L.J.
369 (1956).
114 See the discussion in Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75,
79 (2d Cir. 1961).
55 See Note, supra note 53.
li6 Summers, supra note 43, at 186-87. However, see Phillips v. Teamsters Union,
209 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1962), where a member, suspended for riotous conduct at a
union meeting, was afforded a trial de novo before the union trial body pursuant to
a stipulation entered in his action under Title I of the LMRDA. He was found guilty
after this trial and subsequently sought to secure a de novo hearing of the facts in the
federal district court. The court, however, refused to apply a more stringent review
standard than that applied to a trial court or an administrative agency. It even suggested that the union decision might have finality. On review of the record, the court
held that the union decision was amply supported by evidence. Since the case did not
involve allegations that the member was suspended for exercising rights protected by
the LMRDA, but rather that he had not done the acts which, if proved, would have
justified the suspension, it is of course not authority for the scope of review when a
violation of LMRDA rights is alleged.
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principles is inadequate because the terms of the contract-the
constitution and the bylaws of the union-are beyond the control
of the individual union member. He has no choice but to accept
them or remain outside the union. The union-member "contract"
is as much a contract of adhesion, with the terms already set and
beyond bargaining, as is the typical automobile sales contract. 57
It is incumbent upon the courts to interpret, construe and apply
this "contract" so as to preserve those interests of the weaker party
which are entitled to judicial protection. Thus, even under a
"contract" analysis, the application of the exhaustion of remedies
requirement is subject to judicial policy considerations.
On a more abstract level, the argument which supports the
exhaustion requirement, as a means of preserving private decisionmaking, must face the fact that unions have not generally developed independent judicial machinery. 58 Consequently, the existing union decisional machinery does not inspire confidence that
the merits of a case will prevail. Furthermore, if the member has
sued without protecting his right to proceed internally, a denial
on exhaustion grounds may entirely terminate his claim, since
many union constitutions limit the time for appeal.
For these reasons, the courts were reluctant to apply the exhaustion doctrine if the member was, on the merits, entitled to
prevail. This, I think, explains why the courts initially heard
the merits of every case, even those ultimately dismissed on the
ground that internal remedies had not been exhausted.
Prior to the LMRDA, then, the courts usually handled unionmember disputes in the following manner: (1) The court would
hear the merits of the case.59 (2) If, after hearing the merits, the
court concluded that the member was entitled to prevail, it
would avoid the exhaustion requirement by applying an exception. 60 (3) If the court did not believe plaintiff was entitled to
57 See Grodin, Legal Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, in PUBLIC POLICY AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 182, 189-90 (Shister, Aaron &: Summers ed. 1962). For a discussion
of the law in the automobile contract situation, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness
for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 493, 540 (1962).
58 See BROMWICH, UNION CONSTITUTIONS 29-35 (1959); Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. &: LAB. REL. REv. 15 (1950).
59 See Summers, supra note 43, at 207-12; Note, supra note 53, at 385.
60 This point is made clear in connection with procedural matters in Annot., Exhaustion of Remedies Within Labor Union as Condition of Resort to Civil Courts by
Expelled or Suspended Member, 168 A.L.R. 1462, 1469 (1947): "[T]he rule as to exhaustion of internal remedies presupposes a legal and regular proceeding for suspension or
expulsion."
In discussing the principle that, "if the action of the union is without jurisdiction,
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prevail, it would apply the doctrine and leave the member to the
judgment of the union tribunal. 61 The decision to require exhaustion of internal remedies was a clear expression of the court's
view of the merits of the case. It was a procedural way of stating
a substantive conclusion.

2. Exhaustion of Remedies Under the LMRDA
Under the LMRDA, the function of the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine is vastly different. Congress took seriously the contention
that democratic values require that the union be allowed a genuine
opportunity to correct its own mistakes. The statutory exhaustion
of remedies doctrine is designed to provide a time period within
which this purpose might be achieved. Its nature is purely procedural. The exhaustion concept has been drained of the substantive implications which it had at common law. The basic difference between the statutory and common-law exhaustion
concepts is that the statutory exhaustion doctrine may be applied
or is without notice or authority or not in compliance with the rules or constitutional
provisions, or is void for any reason," the exhaustion doctrine does not apply, Professor
Summers, supra note 43, at 210, stated: "It is apparent that this exception is capable
of completely swallowing the rule, for it is applicable to every case in which the disciplined member has a meritorious claim. Contrary to the other exceptions, it has no
visible roots in any of the policies underlying the rule, but under the thin verbal disguise of 'no jurisdiction' and 'void' it repudiates the rule and its policies. This exception, like other exceptions, is not consistently applied, but it is used frequently and is
always available for courts to use when they feel the need to grant relief."
61 Professor Summers, who has investigated this problem more extensively than anyone else, has produced two sets of interesting statistics on the role of the exhaustion
doctrine.
In Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1092 (1951),
after examining all the reported decisions, he stated: "The general repudiation of both
the exhaustion rule and its underlying policy is clearly revealed by a brief tabulation
of the court decisions. Out of about 200 cases in which exhaustion of remedies was a
potential issue, it was actually mentioned in 98. Out of these 98 cases, the courts used
exceptions to excuse exhaustion in 60, and in 16 others discussed the merits and found
the discipline entirely proper. In only 22 cases out of 200 did the courts rely on the
exhaustion requirement as the principal ground for refusing to grant relief."
In 1960, Professor Summers reported on his extensive examination of cases which
had been decided in the state of New York in a ten-year period. Summers, supra note 43.
After discussing the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, Professor Summers concluded:
"These multiple exceptions have obviously removed the requirement of exhaustion as
an insuperable obstacle to judicial intervention. Systematic study of the cases shows
that by applying the exceptions courts have sapped the rule of almost all vitality except
in random cases. Out of more than 100 discipline cases, the rule has been applied in
20, but even this may exaggerate its importance. In seven of those cases, the court's
opinion makes clear on its face that the plaintiff's case had no merit or was procedurally defective, and that failure to exhaust was added only as a makeweight. In six,
suit was brought even before the union trial body had made a decision, and in none
of these was there any clear error shown in the proceedings. The remaining seven
cases ••. are not all of one piece." Id. at 210.
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by the court on the moving papers without reaching toward a
decision on the merits.62
The LMRDA allows the courts, at their discretion, to disregard
the requirement of exhaustion. But the courts can protect the
value of internal union decision, and also protect the member, by
granting temporary relief while the member pursues his remedy
within the union. With such temporary relief to protect him from
immediate harm, the union member should be required to pursue
his internal remedy, if such a remedy is clearly available. 63 Thus
the court need not pass on the merits during the period in which
exhaustion of internal remedies is required.

D. LMRDA Standards Governing Union Action
This reading of section 10l(a)(4) gives the union greater freedom from judicial supervision during the first four months after
62 Three state courts have recently held that a union member who sues the union
alleging improper handling of an internal matter must plead either that he has ex•
hausted his internal remedies or has been excused therefrom. Knox v. Local 900, UA,v,
361 Mich. 257, 104 N.W.2d 743 (1960); Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173,
161 A.2d 603 (1960); Kopke v. Ranny, 16 Wis. 369, 114 N.W.2d 485 (1962). One lower
state court has gone farther and held that a general allegation of exhaustion of internal
remedies is not sufficient. The member must indicate with particularity the remedies
he has utilized. Local 2, Int'l Org. of Masters v. International Org. of Masters, 50 L.R.R.M.
2167 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
On the other hand, one federal district court has held that the plaintiff need not
plead exhaustion of internal union remedies to survive a motion to dismiss, but that
the factual basis for the exception to the exhaustion requirement must await trial on
the merits. Deluhery v. Marine Cooks Union, 49 L.R.R.M. 2756 (S.D. Cal. 1961). If,
as a matter of substance, the federal courts under § 10l(a)(4) limit themselves to granting
temporary relief within the four-month period, the important allegations in the pleading should deal with the question of whether temporary relief should be granted. The
pleadings should disclose facts relating to exhaustion. Thus, the state pleading cases
cited above seem more consonant with the substantive law which limits federal courts
to temporary relief within the four-month period.
Another approach which satisfies the mandate of § 10l(a)(4) was adopted in Light
v. Erskine, 47 L.R.R.M. 2276 (W.D. Mich. 1960), where the court stayed an action under
the LMRDA pending the expiration of the requisite period.
63 In Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 929 (1961), the court of appeals reversed a dismissal for failure to exhaust
internal union remedies, stating: "[\V]here the internal union remedy is uncertain and
has not been specifically brought to the attention of the disciplined party, the violation
of federal law clear and undisputed, and the injury to the union member immediate
and difficult to compensate by means of a subsequent money award, exhaustion of union
remedies ought not to be required." Id. at 81. The case was remanded with instructions to grant a temporary injunction against the disciplining, which, in that case, consisted of blacklisting the member in the union's publication.
After the temporary injunction was issued by the district court, defendant union filed
an answer raising a number of issues not presented to the court of appeals, including
the question of plaintiff's status as a dues-paying member in good standing. Plaintiff
moved to make the injunction permanent and for an assessment of damages, but the
district court denied the motion, pending further development of facts relative to the
defenses and the disposition by the Supreme Court of a petition for certiorari. 48
L.R.R.M. 2652 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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disciplining a member than did the common law. Thereafter,
union decisions are subjected to a more extensive judicial scrutiny
than was the case at common law. The federal courts are required
by the LMRDA to measure the union discipline against two statutory standards, procedural and substantive.
Procedural. The procedure by which the disciplining was imposed must have afforded the member notice, opportunity to prepare a defense, and "full and fair" hearing under section IOI(a)(5).
All union disciplinary action must meet this standard, whether or
not it infringed on any other rights of the member. 64 In deciding
whether a full and fair hearing has been given by the union, the
courts must necessarily examine the evidence presented before the
union tribunal. The scope of this judicial review is now being
established by the courts. If the substantive claim of the member
is that his rights under the union constitution or bylaws have been
infringed, the courts may continue to apply the "substantial-evidence" test developed at common law. 65 How significant this standard is as a limitation on judicial action is difficult to determine.
Professor Summers believes that the courts have not in fact been
limited by this formulation. 66
The courts are free to adopt standards of review in these cases
which will encourage the union to develop impartial internal review channels, such as those found in the UAW's Public Review
Board, and in the Upholsterers' Union. 67 If the courts were to
give more deference to decisions of such tribunals than to decisions emanating from the usual union appellate process, the development of impartial review machinery might be promoted.
See, e.g., Rekant v. Shocp.tay-Gasos Union, 205 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
ms For a discussion of the substantial-evidence test, see Summers, supra note 53, at

64

1084; Summers, supra note 43, at 185. For a case applying the test under the LMRDA,
see Phillips v. Teamsters Union, 209 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1962).
In Robinson v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 52 L.R.R.M. 2703 (W.D. Wash.
1963), the court said: "[T)he1e was evidence on which the trial body could have relied
in support of its findings and conclusions, and it is not the function of this court to
evaluate the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses in order to substitute
its own judgment for that of the trial body as to the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence." The union action was upheld. In Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers,
52 L.R.R.M. 2872 (D. Conn. 1963), the court stated the other side of the coin: "[I)n
determining whether a full and fair hearing has been granted, it is within the province
of the Court to satisfy itself that the findings and conclusions of the presiding trial
hearing officer .•• are sufficient as a matter of law to sustain a finding of guilt. ·where
the record clearly indicates that the rule of law upon which conclusions were reached
was in error, then such findings and conclusions should be set aside." The discipline in
this case was set aside.
oo Summers, supra note 43, at 185.
07 For a discussion of the functioning of the Public Review Board, see material
cited in note 32 supra.
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This approach would satisfactorily resolve the dilemma created
by the LMRDA requirement of a "fair hearing," unaccompanied
by a requirement of an impartial tribunal.
Substantive. The second type of standard against which union
disciplining must be measured under the LMRDA is substantive
in nature. Rights to participate in union activities are protected
by Title I from union retaliation and discrimination. The
LMRDA, in implementing this protection, imposes absolute limits
on the power of the union to take disciplinary action. Transgression of these limits may be the subject of a federal district court
action. 68 Since the opportunity for union self-correction is equally
important in cases involving alleged violations of LMRDA substantive rights, the statutory exhaustion principle applies in this
area also. 69 However, the responsibility of the district courts at
the expiration of the four-month period is different in these cases
from those involving rights claimed under the union constitution and bylaws. Where substantive rights protected by the
LMRDA are involved, application of the "substantial-evidence"
test would allow the union tribunal to determine if the union
had violated the LMRDA. Therefore, a de novo consideration of
the facts by the district court is required. It is nonetheless useful,
for two reasons, to require the member who claims a violation of
LMRDA substantive rights to exhaust his intra-union remedies
during the four-month period: first, settlements may be possible;
and secondly, the LMRDA, in some cases, requires the court to
judge the reasonableness of the union's conduct. This judgment
can be facilitated if the union has developed the case from its
perspective through the internal union processes. The cases in
which reasonableness must be evaluated include:
68 "Sec. 102. [29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. IV, 1963)] Any person whose rights secured by
the provisions of [Title I] have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring
a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be
brought in the district court of the United States for the district where the alleged
violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located.
"Sec. 103. [29 U.S.C. § 413 (Supp. IV, 1963)] Nothing contained in this title shall
limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State
or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and
bylaws of any labor organization. . . .
"Sec. 609. [29 U.S.C. § 529 (Supp. IV, 1963)] It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of
its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this
Act. The provisions of section 102 shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section."
69 Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 929 (1961).
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(a) Cases in which the employee claims his LMRDA rights
were violated while the union claims he was disciplined for some
permissible reason other than a violation of his statutory rights.
In these "dual motive" cases, the courts may well be influenced
in their decision by a well-developed record within the union
review channels.
(b) Cases in which the exercise of LMRDA rights is limited
by reasonable qualifications which may be imposed by the union.
In these cases, the development of a record by union tribunals
may be important to an accurate judicial determination of whether
the disciplining imposed was within the area of discretion left
to the union. 70
The common-law and statutory concepts of exhaustion of
remedies serve different ends and cannot be considered as complementary. The courts have correctly treated the statutory exhaustion requirement as a legislative substitute for the commonlaw exhaustion requirement.

E. The Approach of Counsel
The exhaustion of remedies doctrine is a rule of administrative
convenience which, in one sense, is addressed to lawyers whose
belief that there is only one correct road to relief requires that
they choose between the internal union remedy and going into
court. Plaintiff's counsel in many cases need not make any such
choice. To avoid being trapped by the doctrine of exhaustion in
uncertain situations, it is proper to proceed simultaneously within
the union and to begin a judicial proceeding. It is better to pursue
the various alternative than to lose the case because the alternatives
exist.
An additional dimension of the problem of protecting the
union member involves the role of counsel. Today, most of the
members of the bar who understand the intricacies of labor
relations represent either management or unions or both. These
attorneys may be hesitant to take an individual's claim against
either union or management, and the individual may be reluctant to retain them. The individual then must seek counsel from
among general practitioners who are neither attuned to labor
70 The "equal· rights" to nominate, vote, attend and participate in union meetings
guaranteed under § lOl(a)(l) are subject to "reasonable rules and regulations." Freedom
of speech for union members protected in 10l(a)(2) is subject to "published and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings," and the right of the union to adopt
and enforce "reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the
organization ••••" See Phillips v. Teamsters Union, 209 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1962).

1464

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

relations nor well versed in the law relating to internal union affairs. This imbalance in representation aggravates the weaknesses
of the statute. The answer to this problem may lie, as it has in
other areas, in having an administrative agency act as counsel for
the employee. The seeds of this idea are present in the NLRB
proceedings and in the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor over
union elections. Alternatively, it is possible that the answer may
lie in a legal profession more adequately prepared to represent
the individual.
The employee has his greatest protection against union action
in the general political realm. He is now reasonably protected in
the realm of internal union affairs. But the contrast between both
of these areas and the law relating to employee rights concerning
economic matters is sharp and startling. In connection with economic matters, the union-particularly when it acts in conjunction with the employer-has heretofore been allowed to exercise
nearly absolute power over the claims of the individual employees.

Ill.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

"The task of this Court to maintain the balance between liberty and authority
is never done, because new conditions today upset the equilibriums of yesterday.
The seesaw between freedom and power makes up most of the history of governments ••.•" Justice Robert H. Jackson (1950).71

Collective bargaining has brought prestige, power, respectability and authority to the labor union movement.72 Unions have
checked the arbitrary will of the employer, and substituted a rough
rule of law governing employment activities; they have improved
the economic position of the employees they represent both in
direct wage increases and in an impressive array of fringe benefits
and devices to protect the jobs of the workers. Collective bargaining has become an accepted institution in many industries and
with many employers.
Various forces at work in the bargaining process have worn
down the harsh edges of antagonism and produced a variety of
methods of accommodation between labor and management rep71 American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950) (concurring opinion).
72 For a variety of reasons, unions are now losing ground, at least in the sense that a
smaller proportion of the labor force is unionized than was true in earlier years. See U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1962, TABLE No. 319,
at 241 (1962). For discussions of this diminution of relative union power, see BARKIN,
THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1962); BERNsrEIN, LABOR'S POWER IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY (Univ. of Cal. Inst. of Ind. Rel. reprint No. 112, 1962).
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resentatives. 73 While the spirit of accommodation may give way
at negotiation time to the spirit of conflict, in in~reasing numbers
of "stable relationships" the parties have learned to accept one another, to iron out their differences, and to submit the irreconcilable points either to an arbitrator or to occasional tests of bargaining strength. 74
The very success of the collective bargaining process has created
new problems for the relation between the union and the employee
whom it represents. For the union's interests are now partially
shaped by a desire to accommodate to management's needs, and
vice versa. When union and employee interests correspond, the
spirit of accommodation is of undoubted value to the employee.
But, where union and employee in-erests differ, as they may on
occasion, the spirit of accommodation-the success of collective
bargaining-spells difficulty for individual rights of the employees.

A. Factors Limiting the Significance of Individual Claims
On many matters, the union hierarchy may be forced to choose
between the competing claims of different union subgroups, for
the union consists of men with disparate interests; differences in
age, health, marital status, aspirations, skills, and departmental
outlook mark the union membership. The internal union political
process provides the forum in which many such decisions are
initially hammered out. A basic reason for internal union democracy is to allow the full interplay of interested groups in developing the union's bargaining policy.
73 There is now a rather extensive body of literature discussing this aspect of collective bargaining. Perhaps the best discussion can be found in BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY ch. IO (rev. ed. 1961), entitled "The Capitalism of the Proletariat; a Theory of
American Trade Unionism." For an analysis of how the use of the grievance procedure
leads to accommodation in day-to-day bargaining activities, see Ryder, Some Concepts
Concerning Grievance Procedure, 7 LAB. L.J. 15 (1956). See also KE:RR, UNIONS AND UNION
LEADERS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING 8-9 (1957), where it is stated:
"If freedom is defined as the absence of external restraint, then unions reduce freedom, for they restrain the worker in -many ways. They help to establish formal wage
structures, seniority rosters, work schedules, pace of output, and the pattern of occupational opportunities, all of which limit his freedom of choice. They decide when
he shall strike and not strike. They are-and this is one of the essentials to an understanding of unionism-disciplinary agents within society. They add to the total network
of discipline already surrounding the workers through the practices and rules of the
employer. They too insist upon order and obedience. It is inherent in their very existence. Two bosses now grow where only one grew before."
Sec KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SE'ITLEMENTS (1961), for vivid descriptions of the
workings of the bargaining process in the administration of the labor agreement.
74 Sec Ross 8c HARTMAN, CHANGING PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT (1960). The
general decline of the incidence of strikes in the United States since 1946 is charted in
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1962, TABLE
No. 323, at 243 (1962).
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Because the position of the union will reflect not only a desire
to accommodate to management, but also some accommodation
between the various claims within the union, there is an increasing likelihood that a given individual or group claim will be
rejected by the union. The individual or group is hard put to
find an alternative method of securing protection for such claim.
A change in membership from one union to another is becoming more difficult for an employee because of the widespread
existence of "no-raiding" agreements.75 In fact, only those unions
outside the AFL-CIO umbrella, such as the Mine Workers and
the Teamsters, provide a haven for employees who are dissatisfied
with their union's decision-making. Craft severance of part of a
bargaining unit is also difficult; 76 and the mandatory settlement
of jurisdictional disputes further reduces the choice of a labor
organization open to employees.77
This reduction in alternatives is not the result of selfish powerseeking by the unions; it is the consequence of the increasing
bureaucratization and centralization of society in the interests of
technology and efficiency. These interests demand that the union
be given power commensurate with its responsibilities-the power
to agree with the employer in such a way as to bind the employees.
This power is exercised within a structure which may make
recognition of individual or minority claims difficult. Union
policy decisions, in connection with the negotiation of new contracts, may be made at a high level within the union, away from
the field in which any small group might significantly influence
the decisions. 78 Administration of the labor agreement, on the
other hand, is most often done by the union at the local level, and
the minority or individual may be in a better position to make his
judgment felt. But with the closeness of the relation between
officer and member comes the increased possibility that officers
may abuse their power by acting on the basis of personal sentiments rather than the merits.79
All of these factors have coalesced to make the union decision
in any aspect of collective bargaining the critical one so far as the
75 See Cole, Union Self-Discipline and the Freedom of Individual Workers, in LABOR
IN A FREE SocIETY (Harrington 8: Jacobs ed. 1959).
76 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 792 (1959).
77 NLRB v. Radio Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573 (1961), 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1142, 75

HARV. L. REV. 221.
78 Beach, The Problem of the Skilled Worker in an Industrial Union: A Case Study,
in CORNELL INsrITUTE OF LABOR RELATIONS REsEARCH 8-15 (Fall-Winter 1961).
79 E.g., O'Brien v. Dade Bros., 18 N.J. 457, 114 A.2d 266 (1955); Kuzma v. Millinery
Workers, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953).
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employees are concerned. For if that decision is adverse to their
claims, the likelihood of the employees' securing protection in
the judicial forum is slight. At least four types of problems confront such employees:
(I) Union and employer acting jointly represent important
and influential segments of our social-economic system. When they
have agreed on a point, it requires a clear understanding of possible limiting principles, as well as some judicial courage, to disregard their jointly expressed desires.
(2) The union and employer, in their agreement, are claiming to further the collective bargaining process. Since the national
labor policy strongly prefers union-employer agreement to unionemployer conflict, the need for careful articulation of limiting
principles is again apparent.
(3) The employee's claim in most cases rests on a collective
agreement negotiated by the union and the employer. 80 His complaint is either that they have negotiated away rights previously
established through collective bargaining, or have administered
away rights under presently enforceable agreements. He now contends that they are disabled from modifying their agreement so
as to deprive him of its benefits. Such a claim often produces the
response that, since plaintiff's rights were created by agreement
between union and employer, they can be terminated by the same
process.81 Of course, this view is valid only if one assumes that
expectations, which arose once the rights were created, are not
entitled to protection. But this is the precise point at issue. If
we assume that seniority or other contractual rights can be destroyed only by a showing of justification by union and manage80 There appear to be two exceptions. Union action may unfairly affect employees
outside of the bargaining unit, as in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343
U.S. 768 (1952). The second exception lies in the case of a discriminatory seniority
system negotiated into an initial collective bargaining agreement. If the classification
is unreasonable, the union and employer must correct the situation, even if this means
improving the position of the group which was initially discriminated against. This
question has most often arisen in connection with racial discrimination. See Richardson v. Texas &: N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229
F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956), discussed in Cox, The Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 157, 176 (1957); Blumrosen, Union-Management
Agreements Which Harm Others, 10 J. Pun. L. 345, 358-62 (1961); Sovern, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 563, 578-87 (1962).
81 See Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938),
in which the union reduced seniority rights of married women in negotiations with the
employer. An action was brought, on common-law principles, by an aggrieved employee.
The court said, in denying relief, "The brotherhood had the power by agreement with
the railway to create the seniority rights of plaintiff, and it likewise by the same method
had the power to modify or destroy these rights in the interests of all the members."
Id. at 206, 277 N.W. at 887.
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ment, then they cannot be destroyed as freely as they were created.
Thus, the statement that contract rights can be destroyed in the
same manner as they were created implicitly denies legal protection for these rights without an analysis of the problem.
(4) There is a tendency to seek limitations on union-management agreement in the collective bargaining contract itself. Since
the employee's rights arise from that contract, it is argued, they
are limited by it. But this search is usually futile, because most
collective bargaining contracts provide that the union, not the
employee, determines the extent to which a claim of violation will
be pressed through the grievance and arbitration procedures.82
Employee rights must be found in obligations imposed on union
and employer, not by their agreement, but by law independently
of their wishes.
Professor Cowan has dramatically described the difference as
one between contract and tort law:
"The fundamental purpose of contract is to create private
legislation. The parties consciously try to put limits on their
undertakings, to restrict their liability to what is assumed or
normally to be implied from their actions . . . . The object
of the agreement is theirs alone, and the legal incidence of
their agreement is limited by the expression of their intent.
So much for the theory of contract. Contract looks to the
future, however fleetingly, and attempts to contain it within
the bonds of legal form. Of paramount importance to it,
therefore, is legal certainty and security. And it is not accident
that the prime legal methods for obtaining certainty and
security, namely rule and form, are peculiarly appropriate to
contract. Here, as in certain other branches of the law, it is
often more important to fix the rule than to fix it right.
"Tort law serves other purposes. Briefly, these are to adjust
inadvertent, not consciously envisaged, losses, and to enforce
general standards of careful behavior. The ideal of tort law
is reasonable conduct. When reasonable expectations comport
with planned undertakings all is well. Tort and contract both
are satisfied. What happens when this is not the case? The
answer in the long run is that planned undertakings must
accommodate themselves to reasonable expectations. Contract
82 See Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). The contract
analysis is sometimes pressed by plaintiff's counsel. See Terrell v. Local 758, Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists, 150 Colo. App. 2d 24, 309 P .2d 130 (1957); Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 249
Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957); Cabral v. Local 41, Int'l Molders Union, 82 R.I. 178, 106
A.2d 739 (1954).
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must yield to tort. But this is far from true in the short run.
Tort does not always conquer contract." 83
B. The Duty of Fair Representation
The "tort principles" operative to protect individual rights
were spelled out by the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville &
Nash1.1ille R.R. 84 In that case, arising under the Railway Labor
Act, union and employer attempted to destroy seniority rights
of Negro employees by cutting off channels of promotion and
continued employment which had previously been established
by collective bargaining. Union and management argued that
their power to change the terms of the collective bargaining relationship was plenary-not subject to legal restraint. The argument was that, by mutual agreement between union and employer,
the employee could be treated just as arbitrarily as the employer
could have treated him before the collective bargaining process
was adopted. The employee was free from arbitrary employer
action only to the extent that the union chose to protect him.
If the union agreed with management in an action which was
arbitrary, there was no recourse under the statute.
The argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Court
held that the statute required the union to represent all the
employees for whom it bargained fairly. 85 It could not arbitrarily
destroy seniority rights of some of those employees. The employer
was also bound by this duty and could not rely on a contract
entered into in violation of the duty. 86 Such a contract was ultra
Cowan, Rule or Standard in Tort Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 141, 152-53 (1958).
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
85 See the discussion in text at note 27 supra. Since the duty of fair representation
flows from the principle of exclusive representation, it is implicit in the National Labor
Relations Act as well as the Railway Labor Act. Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892
(1955), reversing 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953).
The considerable number of discussions of the various aspects of the duty of fair
representation include: Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
22 OHIO ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests; UnionManagement Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 631 (1959);
Blumrosen, supra note 80; Cox, supra note 80; Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement,
69 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1956); Givens, Federal Protection of Employee Rights Within
Trade Unions, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 259 (1960); Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959); Howlett, Contract Rights of Individual
Employees as Against the Employer, 8 L\B. L.J. 316 (1957); Summers, Individual Rights
ill Collective Agreements-A Preliminary Analysis, 12 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LAB, 63
(1959); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 362 (1962); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibilitj• in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
80 "The representative which thus discriminates may be enjoined from so doing,
and its members may be enjoined from taking the benefit of such discriminatory action.
83

84
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vires. Thus, the Court imposed, on union and employer, limitations which arise from values other than those underlying collective bargaining, which are not rooted in contract and which cannot be bargained away by union and management. In 1947,
Congress legislated on one aspect of the duty of fair representation
-discrimination based on membership or non-membership in the
union. 87 Otherwise, the matter has rested in judicial and administrative hands.
The lower federal and state courts have not willingly protected
individual rights under the duty of fair representation. Some courts
initially assumed that the duty was operative only in cases of
racial discrimination. 88 It has become clear, however, that it covers
improper discrimination against other types of minority groups,80
and even discrimination against an individual because of his personal characteristics. 90 The courts have given the unions broad
discretion to select those claims which they wish to present. This
principle of discretion, which the Supreme Court guardedly announced in a case involving the negotiation of a contractual preference for returning World War II veterans,91 has been applied
with vigor by courts to union decisions in the administration of the
collective bargaining agreement, without apparent realization
that the problem of union discretion is different in this latter situation.92
No more is the Railroad bound by or entitled to take the benefit of a contract which
the bargaining representative is prohibited by the statute from making. In both cases
the right asserted, which is derived from the duty imposed by the statute on the bargaining representative, is a federal right implied from the statute and the policy which
it has adopted. It is the federal statute which condemns as unlawful the Brotherhood's
conduct." Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1944).
87 Section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958), of the LMRA makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union to cause, or attempt to cause, the employer to discriminate
against an employee because of membership or non-membership in a labor organization.
Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958), makes such discrimination by the employer
an unfair labor practice, except where the employer is enforcing financial obligations
properly imposed under a valid union security agreement. See Radio Officers Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), for a discussion of the sweep of these sections. For a consideration of their application in cases where the employer has allocated all, or part, of
his hiring functions to the union, see Local 357, Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). The problem of
the scope of NLRB jurisdiction created by these clauses is discussed subsequently in text.
88 See Alabaugh v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 222 F.2d 861 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
839 (1955). The Alabaugh case was overruled in Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters, 52 L.R.R.M. 2881 (4th Cir. 1963).
so See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Ferro v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961), clearly extends the protection of the duty to
any minority group within the union.
oo See Nobile v. Woodward, 200 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1962), and cases cited therein.
01 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
92 See, e.g., Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). The concept
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In addition, the courts have created numerous procedural
and technical barriers which tend to restrict effective protection
of employees. They have insisted on technicalities of pleading,93
have applied doctrines restricting the suability of unions, 94 have
imposed an exhaustion of contract remedies requirement where
such remedies seemed unavailable,95 and have hesitated to allow
the employee to protect his interest in arbitration.96
The result is that, in the area of economic activity, the employee who is injured as a result of the combined action of union
and employer has little chance of receiving protection from the
courts. Recently, the NLRB suggested that it may provide him
with some protection.97 With the possibility that the duty of fair
that the duty is similar in negotiation and administration has been suggested in Co)(,
Rigllts Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 622 (1956).
93 E.g., Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 920 (1962) (complaint which alleged union action was arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable held defective in that it failed to allege that union had bad faith motive,
intent or purpose); Wilson v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 368 Mich. 61, 117 N.W.2d 184 (1962)
(misjoinder of claim); Carlini v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 71 N.J. Super. 101, 176 A.2d 266
(App. Div. 1961), cert. denied, 37 N.J. 133, 179 A.2d 569 (1962) (plaintiff's affidavits charging unfair representation not allowed to expand pleadings).
In Britton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 303 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1962), Negro employees
complained that their jobs had been abolished by contract and the work turned over
to whites. The district court, construing the pleading as relating to the interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement rather than as alleging a breach of the duty
of fair representation, dismissad on the grounds that contract interpretation under the
Railway Labor Act is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment Board.
The district court then denied leave to amend the complaint. The court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal, but awarded leave to amend to allege illegal discrimination which
is not subject to the RAB jurisdiction but is cognizable in the courts.
94 The doctrine prohibiting partners from suing co-partners for wrongful acts of
mutual agents has been applied, incredibly enough, in the modern period, to prohibit
suits by employees against their union. See text at note 148 infra.
95 See Widuk v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 367, 369, 117 N.W.2d 245, 247
(1962). Employee testified that the union official "said I might just as well forget it
[the grievance]; I had gone as far as I could; it was final." The court held that this
did not justify the inference that the union would refuse to represent her, or process
her grievance fairly, or that further processing of the grievance would be futile. Therefore, the employee was not justified in failing to pursue further the contract grievance
procedure.
In Larsen v. American Airlines, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 258 '(S.D.N.Y. 1962), afj'd, 313 F.2d
599 (1963) plaintiff, an airline pilot, was discharged for negligence incident to the crash
of one of defendant's planes at Midway Airport in Chicago. Plaintiff requested a hearing before company officials under the grievance procedure of the contract. The hearing was begun, but adjourned before completion. Three weeks later the company notified him that his hearing was forfeited. Plaintiff alleged that defendant thereby refused
him a proper hearing. The court held that, under the exhaustion requirement of New
York law, plaintiff was not relieved of his obligation to use the grievance procedure even
if the airline refused him a full hearing, but should have gone on to the next stage in
the procedure.
96 In re Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960).
U7 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962).
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representation may be enforced by the NLRB comes the question
of whether the jurisdiction of that agency is exclusive, precluding
judicial enforcement of the duty. This development will be discussed separately. The following discussion assumes that the
judicial forum is available, but much of it is applicable to enforcement of the duty by the NLRB.
The individual's interest in the employment relationship
should be protected by law to the fullest extent compatible with
the continued effectiveness of the collective bargaining process.
This value judgment has its roots in the concepts of individual
liberty first formulated in connection with governmental action,
and in the ideals of individual economic and dignitary interests
which initially prompted the growth of legal protection for labor
organizations. It assumes that the collective bargaining process is
sufficiently mature to bear the weight of some conflicting individual employee claims, but it rejects the use of individual claims
to frustrate the process of collective bargaining. It would restate
the union's duty of fair representation so as to require the union
to maximize individual employee rights in the bargaining process
to the extent consistent with the legitimate claims of the group.
Under this view, protection of individual claims becomes a primary, rather than an incidental, function of the union. Admittedly,
this view has not been widely accepted by the lower courts, with
the possible exception of those in Wisconsin and New Jersey. 08 It
is, however, consistent with three cases decided by the Supreme
Court on the matter,99 as well as with suggestions in some recent
lower court decisions and a recent NLRB opinion.
98 Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963); O'Donnell v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961); Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis.
2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 100 N.W.2d 317, cert. denied, 362 U.S.
962 (1960). See also Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 363-68 (1962), which vividly contrasts the law of New York and
Wisconsin.
In a number of southern states, the courts are still treating the employee as a thirdparty beneficiary entitled to a damage action for wrongful discharge under the collective
bargaining agreement. See Woodward Iron Co. v. Stringfellow, 126 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1960);
Dufour v. Continental So. Lines, Inc., 219 Miss. 296, 68 So. 2d 489 (1953); Mountain v.
National Airlines, Inc., 75 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Scott v. National Airlines, 150 So. 2d
237 (Fla. 1963); Martin v. Southern Ry., 240 S.C. 460, 126 S.E.2d 365 (1962). This view
apparently stems largely from the Supreme Court decision in Moore v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941). Rather than reflecting protection for employees within collective bargaining, these decisions seem to reflect an unwillingness to recognize the important role of the union in the grievance process.
99 See Elgin, J. &: E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), afj'd on rehearing, 327 U.S.
661 (1946). Cf. the extended discussion of the justification for modifying seniority rights
in favor of returning veterans in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The
discussion occupies four pages of the official report and draws on congressional, execu-
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C. Individual Rights Within the National Labor Policy
The law governing individual rights in the collective bargaining process must be developed in a manner compatible with national
labor policy. This requires the rejection of decisions which were
based on the common-law concept of the union as a voluntary
association. 100 The union is now an institution with statutory
authority and responsibility. The law concerning this responsibility must be worked out within the framework of national labor
policy, much as the law concerning collective bargaining agreements is to be developed under the general statutory mandate of
section 301 of the LMRA. 101
"Judicial inventiveness" is required in both situations because
Congress has not dealt in detailed legislative fashion with these
problems. In 1947, during the formulation and passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act, Congress operated on the assumption that union
and employer were in perpetual conflict, and that the employer
would be happy to protect the employee against oppressive union
actions if he were given the tools to do so. Thus, the employer
was made the watchdog of union security agreements, 102 and was
allowed to process individual employee grievances under section
9(a) of the NLRA, regardless of union wishes. 103 The 1947 Contive and collective bargaining policy. In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the discrimination was based on race and no extended discussion was necessary.
100 Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938), justifying discrimination based on sex, is a prime example of such a case. See Blumrosen,
supra note 80, at 367; Hanslowe, supra note 85, at 44-45.
101 Section 301 [29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958)] provides simply that "suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . • • may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties," regardless
of amount or diversity. On the basis of this language, the Supreme Court in Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), held that the courts were to develop
a substantive law of the collective bargaining agreement, utilizing statutory language
and policy to accomplish the task. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); Summers, supra note 98, at 370-76.
102 See International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 307 F.2d 679 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 936 (1962); NLRB v. Die & Tool Makers, 231 F.2d 298 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
103 Section 9(a) [29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958)], after establishing the principle of exclusive representation of the union designated by a majority of employees, provides that:
"[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in
cfkct: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment."
This section h~ been held to_ p~~t, but not to require, the employer to process
a grievance at the instance of an md1v1dual employee rather than the union. See BlackClawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962), and ma-
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gress was unaware that it was actually legislating for a system of
industrial relations in which union and management might cooperate extensively, sometimes to the detriment of the employee.
In 1959, congressional legislation concerning internal union
affairs was grounded on another erroneous assumption. Congress
assumed that there were two separate areas of activity: one dealing with internal affairs generally, and the other dealing with
collective bargaining, and that it could legislate on the one without touching the other.104 The impossibility of maintaining such
a separation will be discussed shortly.
Congress thus never squarely faced the issue of legal protection
for individual rights in the collective bargaining context, and the
law in this area must be fashioned from statutory materials not
drawn with an eye to the problems.105 Policy considerations loom
terial cited in the court's opinion. On the difficulties of implementing the proviso, see
Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 731 (1950).
The policy of the proviso has been used as the basis for an argument that the
employee is entitled to utilize all grievance channels created in the collective bargaining
agreement, including arbitration. See Summers, supra note 98, at 376-85, 399-404. This
argument has been recently adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Donnelly v.
United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). Donnelly and Black-Clawson, supra,
are in opposition on the question of the effect of § 9(a).
On legislative intent, one commentator has said: "It seems probable that the members
of Congress who were active in promoting the Taft-Hartley Act did not consider that a
situation could arise whereby an employer would refuse to listen to an employee and
adjust a meritorious grievance." Howlett, supra note 85, at 318.
104 Section 603(b) of the LMRDA [29 U.S.C. § 523(b) (Supp. IV, 1963)] provides, in
relevant part: "[N]or shall anything contained in [Title I] be construed to confer any
rights, privileges, immunities or defenses upon employers, or to impair or otherwise
affect the rights of any person under the National Labor Relations Act."
"Person" includes labor organizations, within the meaning of both the LMRDA,
§ 3(d), and the NLRA, § 2(1). The right of the union to bargain collectively under the
NLRA includes, in § 8(d), the "negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder." Hence,. textually, it would appear that, under § 603(b), the LMRDA is
not to affect union collective bargaining activity either in negotiation or in administration of the contract. This interpretation is confirmed by the legislative history.
Language similar to § 603(b) appeared in the Kennedy bill, S. 505, 86th Cong., I 1959
Acr. LEGIS. HIST. 74. Senator Kennedy analyzed this provision as specifying "that Titles
I, II, III, IV and V are not to be construed as affecting in any way rights or obligations under the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act," II id. 972.
The language of the statute appeared in § 502 of S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
as introduced, but became § 603(b) by the time it was passed by the Senate. I id. 388,
573. Of this, Senator Kennedy stated that Titles I-VI "are not to be construed as superseding, impairing, or otherwise affecting the Railway Labor Act, or any obligations,
rights, benefits, privileges or immunities thereunder, or as affecting in any way rights
or obligations under the National Labor Relations Act." II id. 1262. Representative
Griffin believed that the language insured that union responsibilities under the NLRA
would not be reduced. Id. at 1521.
105 Mr. Justice Rutledge, who dealt with the basic problem of the relation between
union and employee under the R'?-1-way Labor Act in Elgin, J. &: E. Ry. v. Burley, 325
U.S. 711 (1945), faced the same difficulty under that statute. "Congress was concerned
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large in any such development. The following analysis suggests
that, within the existing statutory framework, protection for individual rights may be maximized without sacrificing the values
of the collective bargaining process.
The national labor policy concerning collective bargaining
has partially evolved through legislative, administrative, executive,
arbitral, and judicial decisions. Most importantly, however, its
development has resulted from the decisions of the parties. It
envisions that the basic terms of the collective bargaining relation will be periodically re-examined by the union and employer,
with both utilizing the full range of economic pressures available
to them. 100 The outcome of such a reassessment is an agreement
which crystallizes the terms of employment for a definite minimum
time, 107 and provides that disputes over the application of those
terms shall be administered through a grievance procedure terminating finally in the decision of an arbitrator. 108 Such disputes
which are not subject to arbitration are to be decided by the
courts. 109

D. Negotiation Versus Administration
Thus, the national labor policy considers that problems of negotiation of the agreement are to be treated differently from problems of administration. More flexibility is afforded the parties in
negotiation than in administration. The analysis of protection
given individual rights must begin with this distinction.11°
Obviously, the distinction is artificial. Negotiation looks to
the future, but may settle matters which have been raised in the
past. Administration deals with existing disputes, but may also
establish a pattern for future settlements. Both processes are part
of a spectrum of methods of dispute settlement which ranges from
primarily with differences between the carrier and the employees, not with differences
among the latter or between them, or some of them, and the collective agent. The
statute therefore was not drawn with an eye levelled to these problems." Id. at 738 n.37.
The attempt to deal legislatively with this problem in § 9(a) of the NLRA is discussed
in note 103 supra.
See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' lnt'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
See § 8(d) of the NLRA. The contract bar doctrine of the NLRB, and the prohibition against most stranger picketing during the term of a contract, NLRA, § 8(b)(4)
and § 8(b)(7), and the presumption of majority status, are all aimed at providing stability in the contractual relationship, as is § 301 of the LMRA itself.
10s United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
100 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
110 See Blumrosen, supra note 80, at 362-66, for additional considerations relevant
to the distinction between negotiation and administration of the labor agreement. Summers, supra note 98, at 396-97, applies this distinction.
100
101
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formal contract negotiations, on the one hand, to informal grievance settlement, on the other. The fact that all such activities are
on a single continuum does not require similar legal treatment of
individual rights all along the continuum.
The basic distinction between negotiation and administration
lies in the fact that the individual employee's claim in the latter
area is rooted in a .collective bargaining agreement, while in the
former case his claim rests on generalized expectations. The refusal to protect generalized expectations need not lead to a refusal
to protect specific claims under specific contracts. The differences
at each end of the spectrum, as they relate to employee claims of
unfair treatment, may be indicated graphically:
Negotiation
Administration
I. No objective standard for 1. Contract language and rejudgment. Interests are lations of the parties supply
pressed to limit of bargaining standard for evaluating the
power. Expectations of em- claim of the employee. Exployees rooted in hopes for pectation of employees rooted
in the contract.
improved treatment.
2. Negotiation policy often 2. Administration p o 1 i c y
developed at high union level, often made at the local level,
adjusting many conflicts with- with no apparent broad implications for other interests.
in the union.
3. Consequence of finding 3. Consequence of requiring
that the union should press a the union to press a claim
given claim may mean a strike may most often be no more
which affects many interests than an additional arbitration.
not otherwise involved.
With this distinction in mind, it should be clear that only the
most important interests of the employees are entitled to protection in the negotiation of a new contract. The ordinary inconveniences or disadvantages to some of the employees should not
be allowed to overshadow the dominant purpose of the bargaining process by delaying or deterring agreement between union and
management. In the case of administration of the labor agreement, however, considerations relating to the stability of contractual rights dictate that the balance be struck more favorably to
the employees.
E. Negotiation and Seniority Rights
The protection of accrued seniority claims in the negotiation of
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collective bargaining contracts is a minimum requirement if individual rights are to be meaningfully secured. Union and employer
should not be allowed to dilute seniority claims of employees acquired under previous agreements without adequate justification
rooted in the national labor policy. The importance of protection
of seniority claims based on prior collective bargaining contracts has
been recognized by the Supreme Court. The Court has recognized
that dilution of seniority rights may be justified as a matter of
national policy in favor of returning veterans111 but may not be
justified on grounds of preferring one racial or union group over
another. 112
In earlier lower court decisions, the union was allowed to bargain away accrued seniority rights on the ground that it was a private voluntary association113 whose members were entitled to only
minimal legal protection. As it has become clear that the union
is an institution vested with power and responsibility by government, the courts have begul) to shift the basis of their decisions
in seniority cases. In the recent cases, the use of more stringent
standards in reviewing union decisions curtailing seniority rights
suggests that the courts are becoming more sensitive to their
importance.
In O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co.114 a seniority problem arose
after the Pabst Brewing Company had purchased the assets of
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323
U.S. 248 (1944).
The problem of racial discrimination and the duty of fair representation is discussed
in Blumrosen, supra note 80, at 358-62; Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion
from Union Activities, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 21 (1961); Sovern, supra note 80.
The problem of discrimination against workers by union and employer because of
their union membership was not directly treated by the ·wagner Act of 1935. Therefore, the NLRB developed two techniques to protect the employees from such discrimination. One was the finding that the employer committed an unfair labor practice
when he participated in such activities. See ·wallace Corp. v. NLRB, supra. The other
was the device of revoking the certification of the bargaining agent. Larus &: Bro. Co.,
62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945). In the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, § 7,
§ 8(b)(l)(A) and § 8(b)(2), Congress made discrimination to encourage or discourage union
membership an unfair labor practice on the part of both union and employer. See
Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). The NLRB has continued to claim,
and to exercise sparingly, the power to revoke certification for "conduct unbecoming a
certified union." See A. 0. Smith Corp., II9 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957); Nathan Warren &
Sons, Inc., ll6 N.L.R.B. 1662 (1957); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953). The
most recent development, in which the NLRB has claimed power to enforce fully the
duty of fair representation, is discussed later in the text.
113 Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950);
Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934); Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry.
Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938); Hanslowe, supra note 85.
114 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961).
111

112
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Blatz, and had decided to close the Blatz plant and thereafter brew
Blatz beer in the Pabst plant employing such Blatz employees as
were needed. When the Blatz plant was closed, Pabst employees
wanted the Blatz men placed at the bottom of the Pabst seniority
list, while Blatz employees wanted the lists dovetailed, or integrated, on the basis of individual hiring dates with the respective
employers. There were 925 Pabst and 940 Blatz employees involved. The union officials recommended dovetailing of the lists,
and submitted the matter to a vote at the union meeting. Some
3,000 Milwaukee area brewery employees voted. The vote was
2,595 to 502 in favor of dovetailing. Some Pabst employees sued
the union and the employer to prevent the dilution of their seniority rights which would result if Blatz employees were allowed
to dovetail into the Pabst seniority list. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court considered the voting procedure to have been fair because,
as it stated:
"To submit the question to only Pabst employees would have
been unfair to the former Blatz employees; it would undoubtedly have resulted in a vote to give themselves preference. To
limit the vote to Pabst and Blatz employees would have given
the Blatz employees the advantage, since they were in the
majority and could be expected to express their own selfinterest. " 115
Submission to the entire membership "would be much more likely
to reflect an objective view than either of the alternatives mentioned."116 "The overall consideration," said the court, "is whether
the bargaining which resulted in the [decision to dovetail the lists]
was in good faith and reached a fair and reasonable solution of the
merger problem." 117
While the court went on to indicate that there remained a
range of discretion within the limits of this test, it preferred the
dovetailing decision over the proposals of the plaintiffs, which
would have subordinated the seniority claims of the Blatz employees. The importance of the decision lies in the willingness
of the court to evaluate the solution on its merits and in its recognition that the political processes within the union would be likely
to reflect primarily, if not exclusively, the economic self-interest
of the affected employees, and might not take fair account of all
relevant factors.
115

Id. at 500, 107 N.W.2d at 489.

116 Ibid.
111 Id. at

501, 107 N.W.2d at 490. (Emphasis added.)
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The inadequacy of the intra-union political process in protecting seniority rights was fully recognized in Ferro v. Railway Express Co.11 8 The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad discontinued its
New York-to-Baltimore run which had originated at the Comminpaw Terminal of Railway Express in Jersey City, New Jersey.
Railway Express rerouted the traffic which formerly used the
B. & 0. service through other terminals in the metropolitan area
and substantially reduced or terminated employment at Comminpaw. Comminpaw employees sought to "follow the work" to these
other terminals under the collective bargaining contract. The railroad argued that there was no "work" to follow, that the employees'
jobs had simply been abolished and that there was no contractual
right protecting them. 119 A settlement was negotiated whereby
sixty-five jobs were created for Comminpaw employees in the Pennsylvania Railroad Railway Express Terminal, on Long Island. The
remaining Comminpaw employees were not protected.
Comminpaw employees who were not among the favored sixtyfive sued, claiming that their contractual rights to follow the work
had been ignored by the union in deference to a politically powerful local at the Pennsylvania Railroad terminal. The court of
appeals construed their pleadings and affidavits as establishing a
violation of the duty of fair representation. The decision suggests
that plaintiffs must establish the following elements if they are to
succeed:
(I) They are entitled to seniority rights, either by virtue of a
prior collective bargaining agreement, as in Ferro, or by virtue of
a discriminatory initial agreement. 120 (2) Dilution or destruction
of such rights by negotiation or other agreement between union and
296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961).
Since plaintiff's claim was based on the collective bargaining contract, its resolution involves the interpretation of that contract. Under the Railway Labor Act, contract interpretation questions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment Boards, and not within the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. But
actions for violation of fiduciary duty are within the courts' jurisdiction. Ferro holds
that this jurisdiction persists even though the interpretation of the contract is an
integral element of the cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation.
An analogous situation can arise under the National Labor Relations Act if interpretation of contract is normally within the province of the arbitrator. A case of
breach of fiduciary duty may require interpretation, but is not for that reason beyond
the jurisdiction of the court or agency. The court may engage in the interpretation
itself, or might order arbitration of the disputed issue of contract interpretation, and
then resolve the remaining controversy with the arbitrator's judgment in view.
1:::0 Compare Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961),
with Trotter v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. Employees, 309 F.2d 584 (6th
Cir. 1962), in which the plaintiff employees sought unsuccessfully to establish that the
union violated its fiduciary duty by failing to negotiate a more favorable seniority
clause. There was no prior seniority agreement on which they could rely, and no basis
118
110
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company.121 (3) Such dilution or destruction was in violation of
the union's duty of fair representation. In Ferro, the basis of the
claim of unfair representation was that the union negotiated the
settlement in order to protect a politically more powerful local
against the politically weaker Comminpaw local. The pith of the
opinion of the court of appeals, reversing a dismissal of the complaint, stated:
"A bargain which favors one class of employees over another is not necessarily prohibited as a hostile discrimination. . . . However, it is not proper for a bargaining agent
in representing the employees to draw distinctions among
them which are based upon their political power within the
union . . . ." 122
In this statement, the court removed the political element as
a basis for union choice between conflicting claims, and required
that the union decision be based on "rational standards" alone.
Decisions subsequent to Ferro have implemented this approach by
emphasizing the requirement of rationality in the choice of the
union.123 Ferro effectively destroys one basis by which broad union
discretion in collective bargaining can be justified; that is, that
the union represents a melange of political forces and should be
was alleged on which the union could be required to create seniority rights for them.
See, on this point, the material cited in note 80 supra.
121 In Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
371 U.S. 920 (1962), it is difficult to determine from the opinion how the employees wen:
harmed when the seniority base was broadened retroactively from a divisional to ~
system-wide basis. Similarly, the identification of the harm is difficult in the following
cases: Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1963); Fiorita
v. McCorkle, 222 Md. 524, 161 A.2d 456 (1960); Gainey v. Local 71, Int'! Bhd. of
Teamsters, 252 N.C. 256, 113 S.E.2d 594 (1960); Bailer v. Local 470, Int'l Teamsters
Union, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A.2d 343 (1960); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161
A.2d 882 (1960).
In Division 14, Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Leighty, 298 F.2d 17 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962), plaintiffs argued, not that the union had been unfair, but
that the international had no right to negotiate any settlement relating to seniority
with the employer. The court was able to characterize this as a representation question
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board.
In Bolt v. Dining Car Employees, 50 L.R.R.M. 2190 (S.D. Fla. 1961), afj'd, 50
L.R.R.M. 2194 (5th Cir. 1962), although faced with a "clean hands" problem, plaintiffs
failed to assert the "political basis" contention of the Ferro case when their seniority
claims were downgraded by a vote of 220 to 20. These cases all emphasize the importance
of counsel in the initial presentation of the case against the union and the employer
to the courts. In the Ferro case the elements of the claim were made out only by
reading together the complaint and affidavits opposing summary judgment.
122 296 F.2d at 851.
123 See Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 920 (1962).
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allowed to exercise political judgments. 124 Ferro represents a long
step toward effective protection of seniority claims in the area of
negotiation of collective bargaining contracts by requiring that
such cases be decided on their merits. Both Ferro and O'Donnell
presage a more searching examination of the union decision to
negotiate away seniority claims than has been undertaken in the
earlier cases. This, coupled with decisions in other contexts recog-·
nizing the importance of seniority claims,125 suggests that the courts
are coming to see the importance, in this time of rapid technological and business change, of giving older employees a reasonable
degree of protection for their accrued seniority.
Despite this trend, there are limitations on the protection which
may be afforded seniority rights under the Ferro-O'Donnell line
of decisions. Seniority rights are circumscribed by the economic
and technological forces at work in the establishment in which
seniority is claimed. If the employer determines to make changes
in his operation which will inevitably entail alteration or reduction of seniority, and the union cannot prevail against that decision, then job security for some employees may be lost. The loss
of seniority in these cases is viewed not as a failure of the union,
but as resulting from larger economic forces for which the law
does not hold union and employer responsible. Protection of employees thus laid off must come from general programs which are
now in the process of formulation. The obligation to provide
employment is one which falls on the federal government, not
upon enterprise.126
The concept of seniority, although it centers on length of service, may embrace other considerations such as skill, ability, former
position, industry-wide experience and the like. Thus, even from
the perspective of a rational decision-maker attempting to minimize the impact of a situation which requires the alteration of
some seniority rights, there may be several possible decisions which
124 Cox, supra note 92, provides a vigorous presentation of this position in connection with the administration of the labor agreement.
125 UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962); Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961). See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability
of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962), and Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and
Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 l\IINN. L. REv. 505 (1963).
126 COMMITTEE FOR

EcoNO!IUC

DEVELOPMENT,

PUBLIC

INTEREST

IN

THE

NATIONAL

LABoR Poucy 122-27 (1961); Armour Automation Committee, Progress Report, 48 LAB.
REL. REP. 239 (1961); Report of President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management
Policy, 49 LAB. REL. REP. 245 (1962). See also Manpower Development and Training
Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 23, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2571-2620 (Supp. 1962); Employment Act of 1946,
60 Stat. 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1958).
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can claim equal validity. 127 In such a situation, there appears no
justification for judicial intervention.
Aside from seniority claims, and perhaps pension rights of
retired employees,128 the principles of collective bargaining established by the national labor policy dictate broad flexibility for
union and management in rearranging the conditions of employment to meet their good faith needs.
In summary, the duty of fair representation should allow the
union, in good faith, to negotiate changes in conditions of employment as to all matters except seniority rights. To justify an abridgment of seniority rights, the union must show not only that it
exercised an honest judgment, but also that it made an appropriate
decision, one based on objective factors, which would persuade a
rational decision-maker, and not compelled by the internal political make-up of the union. By thus structuring the duty of fair
representation, protection can be afforded to crucial individual
rights of job security while leaving the collective bargaining process otherwise free of substantive limitations.

F. Individual Rights in the Administration
of the Labor Agreement
The relationship between individual and union in the administration of the labor agreement must also be developed with
reference to the national labor policy. This policy favors the settlement of disputes which arise under a collective bargaining agreement by a process which has two phases. First, disputes are discussed between union and employer representatives through a
grievance procedure at progressively higher levels of the bureaucracies involved, looking toward an acceptable adjustment. Secondly,
disputes which are not resolved in the grievance procedure are
s~ttled by arbitration. 129
127 For example, in O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W .2d
484 (1961) [see text accompanying note 114 supra], if the union had decided to integrate the seniority lists on the basis of original hiring date in the industry instead of
the original hiring date with the previous employer, the result would have seemed as
rational as the one reached, and probably would have been upheld, even though it
might produce different results in particular instances.
Compare the approach of the union involved in Gavigan v. Bookbinders Union,
406 Pa. 508, 178 A.2d 567 (1962), with that involved in Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224
(D.C. Cir. 1960). For a graphic description of the variety of methods used to integrate
seniority lists in one industry, see Mater and Mangum, The Integration of Seniority
Lists in Transportation Merge,-s, 16 IND. &: LAB. REL. REP. 343 (1963).
128 See Aaron, supra note 85.
129 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). "Arbitration is a stabilizing influence
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This policy limits the employee's right to sue to protect his
expectations under a collective bargaining contract. To permit
employee suits without limitation would weaken the grievance
procedure, and would reduce management incentive to settle with
the union because the settlement would lack finality. It would
also make union officials more reluctant to settle disputes with
management for fear of embarrassment if the settlement were later
upset by a court.130
Recognition of an employee's right to sue in all cases would
also weaken the arbitration process. For, in an employee suit, the
court, rather than the arbitrator, would decide the meaning of the
agreement; finality of the arbitrator's decision would thus be denied.181 Consequently, the national labor policies supporting the
grievance and arbitration processes require that the employee not
be permitted to sue in every case in which he claims that his rights
under the collective bargaining agreement have been violated.132
In addition, control of the grievance and arbitration machinery is
usually vested by contract in the union. 133 The employee, thereonly as it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise under the
agreement." Id. at 567.
130 Protection of the grievance channels is the basic explanation for the requirement, nearly universally imposed, that the employee exhaust the grievance procedures
before being allowed to sue for violation of the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958); Rowan
v. McKee, Inc., 262 Minn. 366, 114 N.W.2d 692 (1962); Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
25 N.J. 541, 138 A.2d 24 (1958); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882
(1960); Kopke v. Ranny, 16 Wis. 2d 369, 114 N.W.2d 485 (1962).
181 This is the basis for holdings that, even if contract remedies are exhausted or
waived, the employee may not maintain an action for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement against his employer where the agreement provides that questions of breach
of contract are referable to arbitration. See Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F.
Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), afj'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960);
Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 130; Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156
N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959). See also Belk v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F.2d
513 (2d Cir. 1963), interpreting contract in light of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195 (1962).
182 Summers, supra note 98; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements:
A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 239 (1959); Report of the Committee on
Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, in PROCEEDINGS oF THE
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS I.Aw 33 (1954), reprinted in 50 Nw.
U.L. REv. 143 (1955), suggest that ultimately the individual should be entitled to press
any claim arising under a collective bargaining agreement to a determination before
an impartial tribunal. This analysis was adopted in Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 190
A.2d 825 (N.J. 1963).
133 Until recently, t!Ie question of control of the grievance procedure has been
considered a matter of contract. If t!Ie agreement clearly allowed t!Ie individual to
process his own grievance t!Irough arbitration, the courts would honor this agreement.
See Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. ll7, 139 A.2d 6ll (1958). If t!Ie contract
language was ambiguous on t!Ie question of who could control the grievance procedure,
it might be interpreted eit!Ier to protect individual employee interests, as in In re Nonvalk
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fore, is not entitled to arbitration of his claims in his own right.m
The result of this combination of contract provisions and labor
policy is to vest in the union officials unlimited discretion to deprive the employee of any job right by simply agreeing with management to do so.
Yet, concern for individual rights within the collective bargaining process requires that this power be exercised for and not
against employees. The Supreme Court has held that it must be
exercised consistently with the duty of fair representation. 185 In
addition, Congress has in three instances adopted policies which
affirm individual rights in the administration of the collective bargaining agreement. These are: (1) the expression in section 9(a)
of the NLRA that the individual may present his own grievance
under specified conditions; 136 (2) the provision of the LMRDA,
in sections 10l(a)(4) and 10l(a)(5), that the individual is entitled
to judicial review of union disciplinary action, which action must
meet the statutory due process standards; 187 (3) the congressional
desire, expressed in section 301 of the LMRA, that the collective
bargaining agreement stabilize the employment relationship. 138
While these statutory standards do not dictate where the line
is to be drawn between individual and collective judgments, they
do reflect congressional concern with sufficient protection of the
individual employee in the administration of the union-employer
agreement.
Thus, the two possible extremes in the relationship between
union and employees in the administration of the agreement are
foreclosed by the national labor policy. The employee cannot
be given a judicial right to enforce every claim under a collective
bargaining agreement, but neither can he be treated as having
no rights against an adverse union-management judgment. A line
Tire &: Rubber Co., 100 F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1951), or to allow the union freedom of
action to control the grievance process, as in Procter &: Gamble Independent Union v.
Procter &: Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1962).
In Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.
1962), the court came perilously close to holding that, as a matter of national labor
policy, employees would not be recognized as having rights under contracts to process
grievances to arbitration. The court reasoned that such a construction was necessary
to avoid chaos in collective bargaining. On this matter, see note 162 infra and accom•
panying text. The court held that the employee has a right to process a grievance only
if the employer and union expressly give him one.
134
135
136
137
138

See notes 131 and 133 supra.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
See note 103 supra.
Cf. text accompanying note 39 supra and note 182 infra.
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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must be drawn between those claims which the union may dispose
of in good faith, and those which must be heard-in some forum
-on their merits. The good faith discretion test does not adequately protect the employee's basic relation to his job. Discharge
and seniority cases involving critical job interests should be heard
on their merits in some impartial forum. 139 The employee should
be allowed to prove that his claim is meritorious. The union would
then be required to demonstrate why it rejected his claim, in light
of its decisions to process other claims. 140 This pattern of proof
might make the duty of fair representation more meaningful. It
is consistent with the proof pattern in cases of prima facie torts.
Plaintiff proves the infliction of harm by the defendant, and the
defendant is then required to justify his action. 141
Thus far, such protection for critical job interests has not developed. Although this area is one where we might expect the legal
system to afford effective protection to rights under a written
document, employees have received little genuine legal protection.
While several courts have indicated that an employee may recover damages against a union which fails to represent him fairly,
this remedy is subject to two defects. The Supreme Court, as we
will discuss shortly, has cast nearly fatal doubts on state court
jurisdiction to provide such a remedy. But the other difficulty is
that the damage remedy against the union may not meet the employee's basic need: the continuation of the employment relationship, or its advantages. This need can only be meaningfully
protected if the employer is subject to suit. But the employer is
130 Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Autonomy 1'ersus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 631 (1959). A bare majority
of the NLRB seem willing to undertake the task. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962), discussed in text at note 196 infra.
140 f'or a clear illustration of this process, see Undezwood v. Neuhoff Packing Co.,
51 L.R.R.M. 2182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962). Plaintiff was discharged for absenteeism. The
union processed her case through the grievance procedure and then dropped it. The
court held that the employer had properly discharged her. Since the contract had not
been breached, the union had not violated its duty of fair representation. A similar
approach was taken in Stewart v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 294 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1961).
The failure to treat a complaining employee the same as similarly situated employees was the critical allegation which led the court in Thompson v. Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters, 52 L.R.R.M. 2881 (4th Cir. 1963), to recognize that a valid federal
statutory complaint had been made against the union. Conversely, a showing that the
union handled other similar situations in a like manner has been accepted as a justification for refusal to issue a charge of violation of § 8(b)(l)(A) of the NLRA by the
general counsel of the NLRB. See Adm. Ruling S.R. 1761, 49 L.R.R.M. 1756, Feb. 6,
1962. For other cases in which the court has passed on the merits of employees' contentions, see Blumrosen, supra note 139, at 657-58.
141 Sec Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 7 (1957);
Comment, 52 CoLuM. L. REv. 503 (1952).
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not directly subject to the duty of fair representation. He is prohibited from benefiting from an agreement which violates the
duty of fair representation. But the force of conventional legal
analysis plus the availability of section 301 has led to the widespread use of an additional theory which will subject the employer
to liability. The most convenient theory available is that of contract. The employee claims that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement by discharging him or denying him
other benefits due under the agreement. He seeks relief as a thirdparty beneficiary.
Thus the "tort" duty of fair representation can be effectively
implemented only by joining the employer under a "contract"
theory. But when this is done, the terms of the particular collective
bargaining agreement are brought into sharp focus. These terms
may and often do deal with the right of individual employees to
enforce the contract in court or to utilize the grievance and arbitration procedures under the agreement. The Supreme Court has
held that the right of employees to sue under section 301 of the
LMRA depends upon whether the contract under which he claims
gives finality to the decisions made within the contractual framework in grievance processing or arbitration. If the contract accords
finality, then the employee cannot sue for breach of contract.142
Contracts containing grievance and arbitration procedures
often permit the inference that control of the process rests in the
union, not the employee, and that the decisions in that process
are final. Under an agreement so interpreted, the individual could
not sue under section 301 because the parties intended finality to
attach to their decisions, and could not use the grievance-arbitration procedures himself because their control rests in the union.
However, the identification of the intention of the parties in
the construction of these agreements is not a simple matter. Most
contracts can be interpreted as ambiguous on the question of the
right of the individual to press his own grievance. The resolution
of this ambiguity will turn, in the last analysis, on judicial policy
in connection with individual rights in the collective bargaining
agreement. From contract considerations we have returned to legal
policy as the basis for resolving the question of individual rights
in the collective bargaining process. This being the case, the
"contract-tort" analysis has been of little utility. It might have been
more profitable had we phrased the question initially as the extent
142

General Drivers Union v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963).
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to which both parties-union and employer--are bound by the
duty of fair representation. However, the courts have adopted the
"contract" approach and have taken three discernible positions on
the question of individual rights to enforce the contract, or to invoke its grievance and arbitration provisions.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted the view of Professor Summers that section 9(a) of the NLRA permits the employee
to press his claims through the grievance and arbitration procedures under the contract without the assent or assistance of the
union. That court said, in Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.:
"If the protection of those employees' interests is left wholly
to the unlimited discretion of the union, then in a particular
situation an important part of the security the employee
hoped to gain by union membership, and which on the face
of the bargaining contract he appeared to have gained, might
be lost without a fair opportunity to defend himself or to
realize upon the benefits granted to him by the contract. And
such loss would occur even though the union acted in good
faith in declining to use the grievance procedure to contest
the validity of his discharge from employment....
"It is true the employee is not a nominal or formal party
to a collective bargaining agreement. But the rights, duties
and benefits of his employment are so created and controlled
by the agreement made in his behalf by his statutory representative, the union, that for some purposes, at least, he ought
to be regarded as a third-party beneficiary in substance as well
as in spirit, or as possessing independent rights under section
9(a) of the Labor Management Relatiom Act ... which ought
to be considered as part of every such contract by operation of
Jaw."H3
An intermediate approach which seems to have been adopted
by the Maryland courts, and which I have elsewhere espoused,
would permit the employee to pursue his action against the employer in those cases where the union breached its duty of fair
representation. This view most closely relates the "contractual"
action against the employer with the "tort" action against the
union. It allows the union and employer to dispose of non-meri14s Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 190 A.2d 825, 835-36 (N.J. 1963). Professor Summers'
articles are cited in notes 85 and 132 supra. Donnelly did not benefit from the solicitude
for individual rights expressed by the New Jersey court, because he had failed to
indicate that he wished to press his grievance "pro se" without union help. This, the
court held, deprived him of the right to do so. The insistence on this rather technical
demand by the individual worker, in the context of a decision favoring his claim, is
incongruous.
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torious grievances, but would allow the individual to press those
claims which the union should have asserted under its duty of fair
representation. In Jenkins v. liVm. Schluderberg-T. ]. Kurdle Co.
the Maryland court explained its position on this question:
"Conflicts of interest may exist or develop in many instances
in grievance matters as between individuals or groups of employees represented by the same bargaining agent. It seems
desirable that the bargaining agent should have power to deal
with such problems. It is possible that even the discharge of
a single individual might have wide repercussions in employeremployee relations, though usually this would not seem probable.
"Possibilities of indifference, favoritism, discrimination
and of trading off the interests of one group or member for the
benefit of another group or member, of course, exist. Yet,
possibilities of abuse of trust and confidence exist, in many
fields .... Courts will redress misuse of power. In the case of
trusts they may take over the direction and control of the
administration of the trust in greater or lesser degree, but
ordinarily they do not do so and leave the trustee free to
exercise the discretionary powers which the trust instrument
confers upon him. In corporate affairs, the courts do not
undertake to take over the functions of the board of directors,
though they may grant relief when the board abuses its powers,
as by favoring the interests of one stockholder or group of
stockholders at the expense of others ....
"[A]s a general rule grievance procedures provided by a collective bargaining agreement should be a bar to suits by individuals against the Employer based upon alleged violation of
the agreement, but that such suits are not barred if the Union
acted unfairly towards the employee in refusing to press the
employee's claim through to, and including, arbitration under
the collective bargaining agreement." 144
A third approach has been adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. The court, construing an ambiguous contract provision as not permitting the employee to process a
grievance concerning his discharge without union assistance, was
unimpressed with arguments based on section 9(a) of the LMRA.
Basing its decision in part on its view of sound labor relations,
the court stated, in Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists:
144 Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 574-75, 144 A.2d 88,
98 (1958). See Blumrosen, supra note 139.
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"Chaos would result if every disenchanted employee, every
disturbed employee, and every employee who harbored a dislike for his employer, could harass both the union and the
employer by processing grievances through the various steps
of the grievance procedure and ultimately by bringing an
action to compel arbitration in the face of clear contractual
provisions intended to channel the enforcement remedy
through the union. " 145
The risks implicit in this position are most vividly demonstrated
by a case arising in the Sixth Circuit.
In Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 146 the company operated a
lunch counter in the Michigan Central railroad station in Detroit,.
where it employed approximately a dozen workers. It became
clear that either money or food was being stolen when food costs
rose significantly in relation to gross sales. The company could
not identify any particular culprit, and wished to discharge all
of the employees. The union objected. Prolonged union-management negotiations followed. The company convinced the union
that a pattern of theft existed. A compromise was reached between
the union's desire to protect the employees and the company's
desire to discharge them all. Half of the employees would be laid
off and replaced with another group. If the ratio of the cost of
food to income then improved, this would signify that the theft
had ceased. The layoffs would then be converted to discharges.
Otherwise, the employees would be reinstated.
The layoffs resulted in a remarkable improvement. The income of the lunch counter went up 250 dollars a week, and the
ratio of cost of goods to gross income returned to a normal level
almost immediately. The union then acceded to the discharge of
the laid-off employees. The union had not acted out of malice or
evil intent. Management had acted out of legitimate motives.
Gladys Hildreth, who had worked as a waitress for ten years~
was among those discharged. There was no proof of her guilt in
the theft. The contract provided that no employee would be discharged except for just cause. She sought the support of the union
in challenging the discharge but was, of course, rebuffed. The
union honored its agreement not to press such a grievance. The
company refused to process the grievance outside of the channels
controlled by the union. Plaintiff sued the company.
313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 1962).
295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). Adhered to after trial, when reviewed in light of
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1963).
146
146
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The initial planning problems facing plaintiff's counsel in
such a case are extraordinary. Most of the potential procedural
obstacles in the Hildreth case were not raised. But in analogous
cases they have so plagued the litigation that the merits were never
reached. The procedural problems include: (1) Indispensable
parties. The union has been held to be an indispensable party in
an action against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining contract on grounds of its involvement as the other signatory
to the agreement.147 (2) Amenability of the union to suit. It has
been suggested that no cause of action may be stated against the
union for breach of its fiduciary duty because the injury was caused
by the mutual agent of the employee and his co-principals.148 The
inapplicability of this defense is clear.149 Where the union
breaches its fiduciary duty, it is not acting on behalf of the injured
employee. Furthermore, th~ duty stems from the federal statute,
not from the fact of membership, and the defense based on membership is technically irrelevant.150 The defense prevents enforcement of this federal statutory duty and is invalid on simple principles of federal supremacy.151 (3) Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Given the plethora of tribunals active in the area of labor
law, the hydra-headed concept of exclusive jurisdiction plagues
every type of action. As applied to the action for breach of fiduciary duty, it takes three forms: (a) The courts defer to the griev147 Nix v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 264 F.2d 875, rehearing denied, 264 F.2d 879 (3d
Cir. 1959).
148 See Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952), which was overruled by Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
149 That the union is a juridical entity subject to suit is almost too clear to require
elaboration. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960); United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958); LMRA, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1958);
Comment, Unions as Judicial Persons, 66 YALE L.J. 712 (1957). Marshall v. International
Longshoremen's Union, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962), contains
a dispositive exposition on the point. See also Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., supra note
148.
150 See note 86 supra.
151 If any further demonstration of the invalidity of the doctrine is necessary, the
incongruity of applying it and the principle of Nix v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 264
F.2d 875, rehearing denied, 264 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1959), at the same time, might be
illuminating. Nix holds that the union is an indispensable party in an action by the
employee against the employer for breach of the labor agreement. But under the
Marchitto rule the union is not amenable to suit by the employer. But if the union
is not amenable to suit, then an action could not proceed against the employer. The
result would be that the employee may never obtain a hearing on the merits of his
contention of maladministration of the labor agreement, even though his substantive
rights in the matter are clear-and all because a partner may not sue his co-partners
for the wrongs of a mutual agent!
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ance procedures under the collective bargaining contract. The
requirement that contract remedies be exhausted as far as possible
is rigorously applied. Any failure to press the claim as far as the
grievance and arbitration procedures permit leads to dismissal. 152
(b) The principle that arbitration awards are subject to minimal
judicial review has sometimes been applied to foreclose full hearing on an allegation that the award was rendered in violation of
the union's duty of fair representation. 153 The principle that arbitration awards are virtually non-reviewable was developed in
cases in which the union vigorously contested managerial action. 154
It has no application to cases in which it is alleged the union violated the duty of fair representation. Evaluation of such a claim
requires full scrutiny of all the facts by the court. 1515 The two issues should not be confused lest the finality principle dominate
the question of whether there has been compliance with the duty
of fair representation. (c) The pre-emption doctrine requiring judicial deference to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB has
been applied by some courts even when there was no indication
that the NLRB would, or could, assert jurisdiction to define and
enforce the duty of fair representation. 156 The present status of
the pre-emption problem in light of recent decisions is more fully
treated subsequently.
Defendant in the Hildreth case did not rely on any of these
procedural defenses, but went directly to the merits of the case.
The employer had, in good faith, entered into an agreement with
the union to solve a difficult labor relations problem. It claimed
the right to rely on this agreement as providing immunity from
an action by a disgruntled employee.
1152 See notes 130 and 131 supra; Blumrosen, supra note 139, at 642-65. The special
problem under the Railway Labor Act of the jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment
Board is discussed in note 119 supra.
153 Palizzotto v. Local 641, Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters, 67 N.J. Super. 145, 170 A.2d
57 (Ch. Div. 1961), affd, 36 N.J. 294, 177 A.2d 538 (1962).
154 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
ms As in Moore v. Local 89, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1962),
cert. granted, 371 U.S. 966 (1963); Underwood v. Neuhoff Packing Co., 51 L.R.R.M.
2182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). In General
Drivers Union v. Riss & Co., 298 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1962), remanded, 372 U.S. 517 (1963),
the court of appeals distinguished between a grievance procedure and an arbitration
award, and refused to attach to a decision of the former-type tribunal the finality that it
was required to give to the latter. The Supreme Court remanded on the ground that
"finality" was to be determined by interpretation of the contract.
156 Compare Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. Employees, 369
P.2d 1006 (Idaho 1962) (no pre-emption of action claiming breach of fiduciary duty of
fair representation), with Baker v. Shopmen's Local 755, Int'! Ass'n of Bridge Workers,
403 Pa. 31, 168 A.2d 340 (1961) (pre-emption of similar action).
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied legal protection for Gladys Hildreth's claim because her discharge had been
assented to by the union in good faith, and such assent was permitted under the contract. The court believed that this result was
called for by the contract and by the national policy of promoting
the collective bargaining process.
The case poses a dilemma. Group fault was established; individual fault was not. The court recognized that there was no basis
for inferring that any of the laid-off employees were more guilty
of theft than those who remained at work. There was simply no
proof of individual guilt. The contract prohibited discharge without just cause and provided for arbitration. In labor arbitration
the burden of proof of just cause is normally on the employer.
When a criminal act is alleged, this burden is substantial.157 In all
probability, an arbitrator would not have sustained the discharge
of these employees. But union and company had agreed to dispense
with proof of the guilt of the laid-off employees. Thus, the union
deprived the employees of a hearing before an arbitrator in which,
on the evidence adduced, they would probably have prevailed.
Gladys Hildreth could not have been deprived of any of her
legal rights, no matter how insignificant, by any court on the basis
of the record in the case. Yet, she was deprived of her job, despite
ten years of seniority, under a contract protecting her from discharge except for just cause, when her union refused to insist that
her case be reviewed on its merits.
The court adopted three erroneous premises in reaching its
decision.
(1) It assumed that the union is entitled to as broad discretion
in the administration as in the negotiation of the collective bargaining contract. This assumption was made explicit by the court
in quoting Professor Cox.158 The preceding discussion demonstrates that the assumption is erroneous, and that the union is
-entitled to a much narrower range of discretion in the administration of the collective bargaining agreement than in its negotiation.159
(2) The court assumed that any limitation on the power of
union and management to agree to the discharge of the employees
157 See Bendix Aviation Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 480 (1956); Universal Atlas Cement Co.,
26 Lab. Arb. 529 (1956); General Refractories Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 470 (1955); Kroger Co.,
25 Lab. Arb. 906 (1955). See STESSIN, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE cb. 8 (1960).
158 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 622 (1956).
159 See text at note 110 supra.
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must be found in the collective bargaining agreement. 160 However, the duty of fair representation is imposed by law, not by
contract. Agreements which violate the union's duty of fair representation are voidable, and management may not rely on them.
Thus, the duty of fair representation is binding on the employer
as well as on the union.161
(3) The court assumed that the recognition of the employee's
rights in this case would render the collective bargaining process
ineffective. "Unless such bilateral decisions, ... between a Union
and an employer, be sustained in court, the bargaining process is
a mirage, without the efficacy contemplated by the philosophy of
the law which makes its use compulsory." 162 Other courts have
made similar statements. In Cortez v. Ford Motor Co.,163 the issue
was whether the employer had violated the recall provisions of the
agreement. The union had failed to press the matter, possibly
because the aggrieved employees were all women. The contract
provided that the union was to control the grievance procedure.
The court said: "It is likewise obvious that for the courts to . . .
[determine the propriety of the refusal to process the grievance]
would quickly bring the wheels of industry to a standstill, along
with the wheels of justice." 164
In another case, the court approved the philosophy of union
control over grievance processing as follows: "A contrary proce100 "Plaintiff's right of action, if any, must arise from the terms of the contract
between the Union and the employer..•.
"The question, then, for decision here is whether such statutory power [of the
union to bargain collectively with the employer], in combination with the terms of
the bargaining contract, authorized the union and the defendant to mutually conclude,
as a part of the bargaining process, that the circumstances shown by the evidence
provided just cause for the layoff and discharge of plaintiff and other of defendant's
employees." 295 F.2d at 663-64.
161 See note 86 supra. Jenkins v. Wm. Schludcrberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556,
144 A.2d 88 (1958), explicitly holds that an agreement with the union generally will be
a good defense to the employer, unless the union acted unfairly toward the employee
in making such agreement.
It is possible to construe the Hildreth decision as implying no more than Parker
v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959), that the agreement with
the union will provide a complete defense to the employer regardless of whether the
union acted fairly, and that the only remedy for unfair union behavior is an action
against it. In Hildreth the action was only against the employer. However, the tenor
of the Hildreth opinion suggests that the court was satisfied that the union had not
failed in its obligations toward the employee. On the appropriate remedy in these cases,
sec Blumroscn, supra note 139, at 658-64.
162 295 F.2d at 664.
103 349 Mich. 108, 184 N.W.2d 523 (1957).
164 Id. at 126, 184 N.W.2d at 532. The action had been brought in assumpsit, and
the court expressly put to one side considerations relating to the union's statutory duty.
Yet, the prediction as to the consequences of recognition of individual employee actions
would be the same whether the recognition came under a contract or a tort theory.
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dure which would allow each individual employee to overrule and
supersede the governing body of a Union would create a condition
of disorder and instability which would be disastrous to labor as
well as industry." 165
There are two difficulties with this type of statement. If it
has validity, it is in connection with a system in which an employee
has the legal right to press any claim of contract violation, irrespective of its merits or the position of the union, in an environment where this is a realistic possibility. However, these forebodings have no application to a narrower rule permitting employees
to press meritorious claims concerning critical job interests, in an
environment where the resort to law is not common. Thus, they
appear to be an example of "straw man rhetoric," a rejection of
a proposition not asserted, which implicitly rejects a narrower
proposition without independent evaluation.
More importantly, the statements lack empirical proof. There
is no evidence that the collective bargaining process would grind
to a halt if individual employees were allowed legal protection
for their critical job interests. The possibility of legal protection might make union and management officials more cautious in disposing of employee claims, but this would not mean
the ruination of collective bargaining. It is as reasonable to assume that union and management would learn to accommodate
to a rule which prohibited them from informally waiving employee rights in connection with discharge and seniority claims.
The history of collective bargaining demonstrates the basic flexibility of union and management. Management has survived the
demise of the managerial prerogative theory of business operation.
Unions have adapted to technological change. There is no reason
to assume that similar flexibility would not exist in connection
with the recognition of individual rights. The prediction that
individual rights are incompatible with collective bargaining is
no more than a cloak for predilection. It is a form of policy making. But policy making should be done explicitly where possible,
not as an implicit aspect of a prediction. Legal policy should protect employees' critical job interests unless it is demonstrated that
such protection is incompatible with collective bargaining. No
such demonstration has been made. 166 It seems doubtful whether
Bianculli v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 115 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
The evidence developed thus far is inconclusive. Professor Summers has analyzed
Swedish law which permits extensive individual protection of his contract rights. See
Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement-A
165
166
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it can be made. Some unions have survived every attack which
government, management, and even other factions in labor have
mounted against them. Recognition of the rights of a few unjustly
treated employees will not spell the doom of collective bargaining.
The ultimate irony of the Hildreth decision is that the arbitrary action of the employer justified the equally arbitrary action
of the union. Granting that, in the absence of unionism, the
employer could arbitrarily discharge some members of a group
without evidence of their guilt, the purpose of collective bargaining is to destroy the arbitrary character of employer action. This
purpose is subverted if the arbitrary employer action becomes the
justification for the union's failure to protect the employee. The
question is whether this was the type of employer action with
which the union was entitled to agree under its fiduciary duty to
represent the employees fairly. The court in Hildreth never faced
this question.
Because of the admixture of contract and tort and statutory obligations in these cases, problems of procedure, identification of
issues, formulation of substantive standards and appropriate remedies are difficult. The forms of action still affect our conception
of legal problems and their potential solutions. The categories of
tort and contract supply us with ready-made procedural, substantive and remedial rules for the disposition of cases. To characterize
a case as tort or contract automatically invokes the rules related
to those respective categories. The problems of individual rights in
collective bargaining contract administration cannot be satisfactorily solved in such a mechanical fashion. An analysis of the
specific problems which seeks desirable and realistic solutions is
Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963). However, Swedish
collective bargaining contracts apparently do not protect job security so most of the
issues which would be critical in the United States do not arise. The bulk of the cases
are wage claims.
Under the Railway Labor Act, individuals have been afforded some minimum
procedural protection without the destruction of collective bargaining. See Kroner,
Disciplinary Hearings Under the Railway Labor Act: A Survey of Adjustment Board
Awards, 46 MINN. L. REv. 277 (1961); Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor
Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 41 (1962).
Moreover, the courts attribute unrealistic simplicity to the grievance procedure itself.
The infinite complexity of the process is vividly described in KUHN, BARGAINING IN
GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT (1961). Kuhn concludes that various work groups within the
bargaining unit exert their technologically based power through the grievance procedure
to improve their own position with little regard for the broader interests of the union.
This "fractional bargaining" benefits organized subgroups within the union, but not
the individual. It works for claims held in common by coherent work groups. Kuhn
suggests that considerable chaos is presently an expected part of grievance processing.
Thus, the "avoidance of chaos" argument against recognition of individual rights in
grievance processing loses some of its significance.
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more fruitful than any attempt to characterize the employee's
claim abstractly as sounding in tort or contract. 167
(I) The issues. To prevail, the employee must establish that
(a) he has a valid or meritorious claim under the collective bargaining agreement, (b) that it was denied by the employer with
the assent or acquiescence of the union, and (c) that the union
was obligated by law to press his claim on behalf of the employee.
Since in most cases the agreement provides for arbitration of such
disputes, this analysis means that the court must determine if the
employee had a meritorious claim worth presenting to an arbitrator, and if it was the type of claim which the union should
have pressed to arbitration.
(2) The appropriate remedy. (a) Damages. The New York168
and Pennsylvania169 courts have held that, in the event the union
fails to press a grievance in violation of its duty of fair representation, the employee has a damage action against the union, but
no remedy against the employer. The Maryland court has held
that the employee in such a situation has an action against the employer as well as against the union. 170
At first glance, the New York-Pennsylvania rule seems to reconcile the individual claim with the needs of collective bargaining.
The employee may sue the union for damages, but the employer
who relied on the union decision is immune. Thus, collective bargaining between union and employer is vindicated. This analysis
is superficial for three reasons:
167 In Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 83 Sup. Ct. 1423 (1963),
the Supreme Court refused to accept the characterization of the cause of action as
sounding in "tort" or "contract" as influential in the disposition of a pre-emption claim.
"It is not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the
determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction." Id. at 1428.
In McGinnis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 75 N.J. Super. 517, 183 A.2d 486 (App.
Div. 1962), an action against union and employer for violation of seniority rights by
failure to recall plaintiff in proper order, the court held that the contract claim rested
in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment Board, but it retained jurisdic•
tion over the action for breach of fiduciary duty. In connection with allegations of
conspiracy between union and employer to deprive plaintiff of his contractual rights,
the court said, at 521, 183 A.2d at 488-89: "[T]hat pleading presents an odd mi.xture of
tort claim and a claim of rights under the collective bargaining agreement." The court
held that the employer was subject to liability on a conspiracy theory.
168 Parker v. Bored<, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959).
169 Falsetti v. Local 2026, UM\\T, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960).
110 Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958).
New Jersey has adopted a rule holding the employer liable for conspiracy with the
union to ignore the employee's contract rights, O'Brien v. Dade Bros., 18 N.J. 457, 114
A.2d 266 (1955); McGinnis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 75 N.J. Super. 517, 183 A.2d 486
(App. Div. 1962). But it is not clear that the employer's liability is coterminous with
that of the union.
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First, it assumes that the employer is entitled to rely on an
agreement made with the union which the union by definition
had no power to make. This premise is refuted by the Steele decision.171 The argument that the employer should not be held responsible for the union's default toward the employee breaks down
because at some point in the negotiation of the grievance the employer will become aware that the union has decided not to press
the claim. Since the individual must exhaust such remedies under
the contract as are open to him, 172 knowledge of the conflict between individual and union will be brought home to the employer.
Perhaps his monetary liability should not reach back prior to the
time he acquired this knowledge, but this consideration goes to
the details of the remedy, not its existence.
Second, the rule assumes that damages against the union are
an appropriate remedy in these cases. The wrong is deprivation
of continued employment, and measurement of damages is likely
to be very difficult. Any damage remedy is likely to be either inadequate, exorbitant, or both, depending on the perspective.
Third, damages against the union do not reflect the wrong done
to the employee. It consists of a breach of contract by the employer as well as a breach of the duty of fair representation by
the union. It seems strange to absolve the employer of liability
to the employee for breach of contract because the union breached
its duty of fair representation.
However, it is appropriate to limit the damage liability of the
employer in such a case for the following reason: if the union had
performed its duty, it would have pressed the employee's claim
to arbitration. If the arbitrator decided against the employer, he
would require the employer to comply specifically with th~ contract in the future, e.g., reinstate a wrongfully discharged worker,
and would order the employee made whole for improper loss of
time, e.g., back pay from the time of discharge to reinstatement.
The employer's financial liability in arbitration is normally limited to past losses which have been suffered by employees. It
does not embrace the present value of lost future earnings. The
future losses are avoided by requiring the employer to perform
the agreement specifically. Thus, a back pay award by an arbitrator will be substantially less than a potential damage award
for wrongful discharge. The employer, by agreeing to arbitrate,
171
172

Quoted in note 86 supra.
See cases cited in note 130 supra.
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seeks to limit his financial liability for breach of contract to that
amount which an arbitrator would impose, and he should not
be exposed to heavier monetary penalties.
But this argument goes not to the question of whether the
employer should be held responsible, but to the appropriate remedy. If the court were to impose the same remedy which the
arbitrator would impose, for example, reinstatement and back
pay in a discharge case, there is no reason to absolve the employer
because the union breached its duty.
(b) Specific performance of collective contract obligations. This
analysis suggests that the courts should order specific performance
of collective bargaining contract obligations as a remedy in these
cases. In the normal case of discharge, this will mean reinstatement, with or without back pay. These obligations have been
successfully imposed by arbitrators for years, with ultimate court
sanction rarely used. There is no practical or theoretical reason why
the courts should not use the same remedies. 173
There may be cases in which, because of the peculiar circumstances, it is appropriate to utilize the damage remedy rather than
reinstatement with or without back pay. In such cases, a court
would be in a position to assess the damages against the appropriate parties.174
(c) Referral to arbitration. The crux of the employee's complaint in most cases is the failure of the parties to submit his
grievance to arbitration. The New Jersey Supreme Court in the
Donnelly case has suggested that the appropriate remedy would
be to require the submission of the grievance to arbitration with
sufficient judicially imposed safeguards to assure fairness in the
arbitral process.
(3) The standard to be applied in defining the union's duty.
Two different points of view have been expressed on the scope
of the union's duty to press employee claims. One is that the
good faith test is at all times sufficient.175 The other is that certain
173 The reluctance to use such equitable remedies because of a tradition of non-enforcement of personal service contracts is not in keeping with contemporary solutions to labor
relations problems. See Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 175 A.2d 639
(1961); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). Compare, however,
Mello v. Local 4408, United Steelworkers, 82 R.I. 60, 105 A.2d 806 (1954). In any event,
if in doubt, the court could always order the matter submitted to an arbitrator and then
enforce his awards. Compare Matter of Exercycle Corp. (Maratta), 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174
N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961).
174 See Blumrosen, supra note 139, at 663.
175 See Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959);
Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960); Cox, supra note 158;
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claims, such as discharge and seniority, must be administered by
the union on their individual merits, while remaining claims are
subject to the good faith test. 176 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
must choose between these views. Hopefully, the Court will provide a level of protection for individuals within the structure of
the collective bargaining agreement which most lower courts have
not heretofore developed. A factor pointing in this direction is
the 1959 legislation concerning employee rights within the union,
which will be discussed shortly.
(4) The standard to be applied in interpreting the agreement
to determine if the employee has a valid claim. The choice here
is between a judicial construction of the agreement, or a judicial
determination that the employee's claim is plausible enough so
that an arbitrator might recognize it, even if the court would not.
The gravamen of the employee's complaint is that his case did
not get before a labor arbitrator. In some instances, arbitrators
use a different hearing process and a different standard of judgment than courts. 177 The employee is not well protected if, as a
result of a union refusal to process a grievance, his case is placed
before a tribunal where he will lose on the merits, while, if the
union had performed its duty, he might have prevailed. Therefore, in cases in which the issue is failure to arbitrate, the court
might arrange, either as a part of the remedy or as a part of its
decisional process, to have the crucial isssues of contract construction determined by a professional labor arbitrator. The judicial
function then would be to determine not the merits, but the meritorious nature of the claim.
This consideration of some of the problems which arise in
the context of an employee's suit suggest that the characterization
of the employee's claim as tort or contract is inadequate to resolve
the various specific problems which are likely to emerge. The
Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959).
176 See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962); Clark v. Hein-Werner
Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 100 N.W.2d 317, cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); Blumrosen, supra note 139. Possibly the cases from the
southern states, listed in note 98 supra, could be cited in support of this view, with the
reservation indicated in that footnote. The articles cited in note 132 supra go farther
in the direction of protection of individual rights than the suggestion made here.
177 The theft cases provided an illuminating illustration. Note the difference between
judicial and arbitral approach to the problem by comparing the Union News Co. v.
Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961) (theft by unidentified employee justified dismissal
of employee without proof of guilt), and Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 25 N.J.
541, 138 A.2d 24 (1958) (railroad entitled to discharge dining car steward if he "converted"
a small piece of ham), with the arbitration awards cited in note 157 supra, which suggest
that arbitrators view such matters with less severity.
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cause of action against the employer can most conveniently be
viewed as contractual, and allowable under section 301, only if
the union breached its statutory duty of fairly representing the
employees.178 The suit against the union can most conveniently
be viewed as in tort, for breach of a duty, and in some cases for
breach of the LMRDA, a possibility which will be discussed in
the next section. The required combination of the two elements
in a single litigation can, if necessary, be viewed under the concept of conspiracy, provided this does not lead to a requirement
of evil motive on the part of the employer or the union. But,
each aspect of the rules relating to such a suit must be examined
in light of its labor relations implications-characterization as
tort or contract is no substitute for analysis.
The ultimate resolution of these problems lies with the Supreme Court, and the time is at hand for the Court to make good
the obligation which it assumed when it first defined the duty
of fair representation: to accept and decide a sufficient number
of cases in the area within a reasonable time to provide the basic
guidance necessary for the further development and integration
of this new field of law. In other areas of labor law, the Court
has met this obligation in connection with the constitutional
problem of picketing,179 the pre-emption problem,180 and the interpretation of collective bargaining contracts under section 301. 181
It should now do so with respect to individual rights in the collective bargaining context.
Two additional developments will affect the immediate future
178 The principle that collective bargaining agreements are to be interpreted as
precluding employee rights to sue the employer for breach of contract [Procter &:
Gamble Independent Union v. Procter&: Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1962);
Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959)] is a rule of
contract construction enforceable only as a federal principle under § 301 of the LMRA.
Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). As such, it must be coordinated with other principles of the national labor policy. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270
(1956), for an analogous case construing the language of a no-strike clause, in light
of the rights of employees under the National Labor Relations Act. The construction
suggested in the text would similarly harmonize the collective bargaining process with
the protection of individual employee claims. Reaching such a result under state law
is Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958).
The possibility of an individual suit under § 301 was established in Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), but the circumstances wherein such actions would be
permitted were not identified. See Mr. Justice Black's dissent, 371 U.S. at 201.
179 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
180 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
1s1 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
370 U.S. 238 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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of the question of individual rights in the collective bargaining
process. They are the adoption in 1959 of the LMRDA and the
decision of the NLRB, in late 1962, to enforce the duty of fair
representation.
G. The LMRDA and Individual Rights Under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Obviously, division of the law regulating the relation of union
and employee into three phases-political, internal and economic
-is artificial. The behavior of union and worker does not always
fall nicely into one of the categories. General political considerations may affect the internal affairs of the union and may also
affect its performance in collective bargaining.182 Furthermore,
there is an intimate nexus between internal union affairs and the
administration of the collective bargaining process. The collective bargaining agreement is administered by the union through
a series of internal decisions relating to position in negotiation,
the processing of grievances, and the taking of cases to arbitration.
This basic fact of institutional life-that collective bargaining
decisions are made through the internal mechanism of the unionwas ignored by Congress when it adopted the LMRDA. Congress
assumed that there were two separate spheres of union activity,
one relating to collective bargaining, the other to internal affairs,
and it intended to regulate only the latter. 183 But this intention
is impossible to carry out. If all internal union decisions are subject to Title I of the LMRDA, this will inevitably include decisions in connection with grievance and arbitration of individual
rights. If such matters are not subject to Title I, then, to that
extent, the protection which Congress envisioned for the individual in the area of internal union affairs will not be provided. The
dilemma is unavoidable, and it falls to the judiciary to strike the
balance. The courts must determine where protection of individuals, incident to internal affairs, leaves off and the union freedom of action, incident to collective bargaining, begins. The
issue is clearly posed by section 10l(a)(5) of the LMRDA which
prohibits a union from disciplining a member without affording
him notice, opportunity to prepare his defense, and a full and
fair hearing. When a union agrees with management that an
employee should be disciplined, does this constitute union "dis182
183

See Part I supra.
See note 104 supra.
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cipline" within the purview of section 10l(a)(5)? If so, the grievance procedure has ceased to be an informal mechanism for adjustment of disputes between union and employer, and must
operate with the formalities prescribed by statute to protect the
employee. The holding in Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
Artists184 is important in this regard. Detroy, a union member,
was blacklisted in the AGVA magazine after failing to abide by
an arbitrator's finding that he had violated a contract with the
employer. The decision to blacklist had been made summarily
by union officials. The court rejected the contention that the
union action was not "discipline" within the ambit of section
10l(a)(5):
"Nor can we agree with the union's claim that the listing
of the appellant's name did not constitute discipline within
the meaning of § 10l(a)(5). If a union such as the AGVA
undertakes to enforce the contracts made by its members with
employers, it does so because such enforcement is to the ultimate benefit of all the members, in that it promotes stability
within the industry. A breach of contract or a refusal to abide
by an arbitration award, therefore, is not damaging merely to
the employer but to the union as well, and the union's listing of those of its members who do violate their contracts is
an act of self-protection. In thus furthering its own ends the
union must abide by the rules set down for it by Congress in
§ 10l(a)(5), and any member against whom steps are taken
by the union in the interest of promoting the welfare of the
group is entitled to these guarantees."185
The Detroy decision is sound on its facts. The union, far from
merely acquiescing in management discipline, had taken affirmative steps to enforce a sanction against the employee. In Gross
v. Kennedy.,1 86 the employer had apparently turned his disciplinary
power over to the union, thus creating an identity between union
and employer disciplining which made section 10l(a)(5) applicable.187 But what of the typical case, where an employee is dis184 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961).
185 Id. at 81.
186 183 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
187 Similarly, when the union voted

to stop sharing work with a member, this was
held to be "discipline" in Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, 205 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa.
1962). The court stated: "Whether the action was disciplinary in nature is to be
determined by its practical effect. By the act of the union, Plaintiff lost his then existing
right to share work. This was of immediate consequence to him, and it was a disciplinary act." Id. at 289. See also Figueroa v. National Maritime Union, 48 L.R.R.M.
2017 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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charged by the employer for misconduct or unfitness, and the
union decides not to press a grievance? Is such acquiescence in the
employer's disciplinary action subject to the notice and hearing
requirement of section 10l(a)(5)?
Section 10l(a)(5) should not be so construed.188 Congress did not
intend to judicialize the collective bargaining process by requiring formal proceedings before a union could agree with the discharge of an inefficient or dangerous employee. If the employee
was properly discharged under the contractual relations between
the union and the employer, the failure of the union to press hii
grievance cannot be termed "discipline." But if the employee
was not properly or justly discharged, then the union action in
refusing to assert the employee's valid claim takes on the coloration of union discipline. This approach will allow the employee
to test the union decision within the framework of section
10l(a)(5) while preserving the union's freedom to refuse to process
a non-meritorious claim against the employer.
If the union takes an affirmative hand in securing the discipline, the action is subject to the procedural provisions of section 10l(a)(5). But if the union action is passive acquiescence, it
becomes "discipline" subject to 10l(a)(5) only if the union was
under a duty to process the grievance. 189 This reading of section
IOI(a)(5) adds little to existing law concerning the union's duty
to process a grievance. Such a duty must be found, and violated,
before section IOI(a)(5) comes into play.
Congress intended that the courts would play a greater role
in determining the relations between union and member than they
had in the past. This conclusion is supported by section IOl(a)(4),
which limits the duration of the required exhaustion of internal
union processes to a maximum period of four months. Congress
contemplated, at the end of that time, judicial decision on the
merits of the union-member conflict.190 This enhanced role of
188 See Rinker v. Local 24, Amalgamated Lithographers, 201 F. Supp. 204 (!.V.D. Pa.
1962); Beauchamp v. Weeks, 48 L.R.R.M. 3048 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Allen v. Armored Car
Chauffeurs, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1960). Implications of these cases are explored in
Aaron, The Union Member's "Bill of Rights": First Two Years, Industrial Relations,
Feb. 1962, pp. 47, 65-67: The cases hold that loss of employment is not actionable under
Title I, LMRDA, because of the availability of NLRA remedies. They are not fully
consistent with the cases cited in notes 184, 186 and 187 supra.
189 Aaron, supra note 188, supports this reading of § 101(a)(5).
100 The suggestion in the cases cited in note 188 supra, that, where the discipline
consists of loss of employment, federal court jurisdiction is pre-empted by the NLRA,
seems without merit (Aaron, supra note 188, at 67), unless the NLRB, under its
newly announced doctrine stated in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19,
1962), asserts power to enforce fully the duty of fair representation. In the event
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the courts may signal heightened protection for the interests of
the individual in the collective bargaining process.
This entire discussion is premised on the assumption that enforcement of the duty of fair representation rests with the judiciary, and is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
A recent development has placed this assumption in doubt, and
has added a new dimension to the problem of the relationship between the individual and the collective bargaining process.
H. The NLRB and the Duty of Fair Representation

Since the Steele decision, it has been assumed that the primary
responsibility for implementing the duty of fair representation
rests with the courts. The Steele case arose under the Railway Labor Act, a statute which was not administered by an agency
capable of enforcing the duty. The duty, however, was carried
over into the NLRA without a full examination of NLRB's power
to enforce it. 191 The NLRB participated in the implementation
of the duty through its control over the certification of the bargaining agent, and by enforcing the duty, imposed by the TaftHartley Act, not to discriminate against employees because of
Miranda is sustained, the cases in note 188 supra will tum out to state the law of the
future correctly, although in error at the time of decision.
101 See Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), reversing 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.),
discussed in Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 154-55, 174
(1957). The duty was applied by the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953), involving the validity of a ~niority preference for returning veterans,
a case arising under the NLRA. The court explicitly declined to face the question of
the NLRB's jurisdiction over the issue of fair representation. Footnote 4 of the Huffman
opinion reads as follows: "International also questions the jurisdiction of the District
Court. International recognizes that one issue in the case of whether it engaged in an
unfair labor practice when it agreed to the allowance of credit for pre-employment
military service in computations of employment seniority. It then argues that the
National Labor Relations Act . . • vests the initial jurisdiction over such an issue
exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board. This question was not argued in
the Court of Appeals nor mentioned in its opinion and, in view of our position on the
merits, it is not discussed here. Our decision interprets the statutory authority of a
collective-bargaining representative to have such breadth that it removes all ground
for a substantial charge that International, by exceeding its authority, committed an
unfair labor practice." Id. at 332.
The technique used in this note, examining the merits to determine if the NLRB
had jurisdiction, was explicitly repudiated by the Supreme Court in San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 n.4 (1959). Under the rule of the Garmon
case, if the matter is "arguably subject" to NLRB jurisdiction, the Board must decide
first if it has power in the matter.
See also, noting the lack of careful analysis at the time the duty of fair representation was transplanted from the RLA to the NLRA, Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195
F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
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membership or non-membership in a union. 192 Enforcement of
this latter obligation led the NLRB, in the 1950's, to develop the
principle that union control over hiring practices was per se an
unfair labor practice because it inherently encouraged union
membership in violation of the NLRA. 193 This principle was
rejected by the Supreme Court in 1961. The Court held that
unions could enter into agreements with management which
would give them control over hiring practices so long as they did
not discriminate on the basis of union membership. The union
was free to utilize such non-discriminatory hiring criteria as might
be agreed to by the employer.194 This approach forced the NLRB
to examine, on a case-by-case basis, the question of whether any
particular exercise of union control over employment opportunities violated the act. When the evidence supported the conclu~
sion that encouragement of union membership was involved, a
violation was declared. 195 But what of cases in which the union
simply abused its statutory powers by violating the duty of fair
representation, with no direct relation to union membership
considerations? Did these cases involve violations of the NLRA?
This issue was faced by the NLRB for the first time in Miranda Fuel Co.,190 decided in late 1962. By a vote of three to two,
192

See note 112 supra.

103

E.g., Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors, 119 N.L.R.B. 883

(1957), rev'd, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959); Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
837 (1954), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 225 F.2d 343
(8th Cir. 1955).
10-1 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. News
Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961).
105 See Brunswick Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 574 (1962), where an employee was discharged
for questioning a union steward's authority to determine quitting time. The Board held
that pressure for the discharge violated § 8(b)(2) because it was based on employee's
failure to perform obligations imposed by the union on its members. In Local 825, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 135 N.L.R.B. 578 (1962), an employee was discharged because
of failure to use the union hiring hall, and the union and employer were in dispute
as to whether the hiring hall contract was applicable to the particular job. The Board
held that the discharge violated § 8(b)(2) because use of the hiring hall was not justified
by any contract and the union was applying its own procedures. In Local 294, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 137 N.L.R.B. No. 112 Qune 28, 1962), the union caused loss of seniority,
either because employee was considered as a trouble-maker by drivers, or because the
union wished to substitute its method of job assignments. Either basis violated § 8(b)(2).
In Local 1070, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 137 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (May 31, 1962), an
employee questioned a union agent as to the reason for a strike. A union official became
angry because his authority and judgment were challenged, and used his office to bring
about the discharge without contractual authority. This violated § 8(b)(2). See also
M. Eskin & Son, 135 N.L.R.B. 666 (1962).
100 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 19, 1962). _Members Rodgers (term expires 1963), Leedom
(term expires 1964) and B:own (term expires 1966) ma~e up the majority, while Chairman .McCulloch (te1m expires 1965) and member Fannrng (term expires 1967) dissented.
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the Board assumed responsibility for the full enforcement of the
duty of fair representation, regardless of whether the case involved
any special aspect of encouragement or discouragement of union
membership.
Michael Lopuch had been employed for eight years as a fuel
truck driver for Miranda. He was number eleven on a seniority
list of twenty-one and had steady year-rounq employment. On
April 12, 1957, Lopuch, with his employer's permission, left to
spend the summer assisting a member of his family in another
state, intending to return by October 15. He returned two weeks
late, but his excuse of illness, backed by a doctor's statement, was
accepted by the employer.
On his return the union sought to have him dropped to the
•bottom of the seniority list. In its argument, the union relied on
a contract clause which designated April 15 to October 15 as a
slack season, during which· time men who would not have been
steadily employed were entitled to a leave of absence without loss
of seniority, if they reported back to the union steward by October 15. Failure to report on time meant loss of seniority. The
union first argued that Lopuch's late return required a forfeiture
of all seniority. Upon verifying his illness excuse, however, the
union shifted its ground of attack. It argued that if the employee
left before April 15 he was not protected against loss of seniority
by the "slack season" clause and must be placed at the bottom of
the list. The company "reluctantly" acceded to this "interpretation" of the contract and, as a result, Lopuch lost some weekend
work.
The NLRB held that the "slack season" clause was inapplicable to Lopuch, who would have had steady work in the summer.
By insisting on an "interpretation" of the clause which covered
Lopuch, the union breached its duty to represent him fairly. The
employer, by acquiescing or participating in this action, also violated the act. The NLRB held, three to two, that it was empowered to redress this statutory violation.197 The majority and dissenters differed on two basic aspects• of the case.
197 This case had been decided earlier by the NLRB on the theory that any delegation of control over hiring practices to the union violated the act, as well as on a
specific finding with respect to the Lopuch case. 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959). The decision
was enforced by the court of appeals [NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 284 F.2d 861 (2d
Cir. 1960)] solely on the ground that, since the agreement did not justify forfeiture of
seniority rights, the action by the union "constituted a delegation of power over seniority
rights which improperly en.couraged union membership and discriminated against the
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The majority reasoned that the concept of fair representation,
implicit in the majority-rule-exclusive-representation principle,
was an aspect of the right of employees to "bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing." The right to
bargain collectively granted by section 7 of the NLRA is the right
to bargain through representatives who will fairly represent the
employees. Section 7 rights are protected against a variety of
union and management unfair labor practices by section 8.198 The
NLRB is empowered to protect section 7 rights by enforcing the
provisions of section 8. Therefore, the full range of NLRB power
to protect section 7 rights is available to enforce the duty of fair
representation. The union violated section 8(b)(l)(A) of the act
by "restraining or coercing" Lopuch when it required the forfeiture of his seniority rights. The employer, by agreeing, "interfered" with Lopuch's rights in violation of section 8(a)(l).
In addition, the union, in seeking to reduce Lopuch's seniority, violated section 8(b)(2), and the employer, by acquiescing, violated section 8(a)(3). These two sections prohibit the union and
the employer from discriminating to encourage or discourage
union membership. The majority held that any abuse of power
by the union in violation of the duty of fair representation had
the prohibited effect, whether or not the case involved any special
issue of union membership. 199
employee." The court of appeals rejected the broad ground of decision proposed by
the Board, stating that the application of contract criteria to determine seniority rights
involving merely administrative or ministerial functions on the part of the shop steward
did not constitute an improper grant of authority to the union. The union petitioned
for certiorari, and the Board acquiesced. The Supreme Court, 366 U.S. 763 (1961), ultimately remanded the case to the Board, for disposition in light of its decision in Local
357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). The decision discussed in the
text was the Board's response to the remand.
108 Section 7 of the NLRA recognizes employee rights to organize, bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, engage in other concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and also to refrain from such activities. Section 8(a) lists a series of employer unfair
labor practices which impinge on § 7 rights. These include: (1) interference, restraint or
coercion of employees for exercising § 7 rights; (2) domination or interference with
union activities; (3) discrimination to encourage or discourage union membership (union
shop permitted); (4) discrimination for invoking the act; and (5) refusal to bargain.
Section 8(b) lists a series of union unfair labor practices which include: (1) restraint
or coercion of employees for exercising § 7 rights; (2) causing or attempting to cause
an employer to discriminate in violation of § 8(a)(3); and (3) refusing to bargain. Section
9 states the principle that the union designated by the majority of employees in an
appropriate local. union shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in the
unit, and gives the NLRB authority to conduct representation elections. Section IO
empowers the NLRB to prevent and redress unfair labor practices.
100 The majority relied on the rationale of Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17
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The dissent did not challenge the crucial premise of the majority that the duty of fair representation was to be read into section 7 and was therefore enforceable by the NLRB. The dissent,
however, argued that the NLRB's enforcement powers were limited, and did not embrace the full scope of the duty of fair representation. Sections 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) prohibit only union-management conduct which specifically was intended to encourage or
discourage union membership. No evidence of this was found in
the facts in the Miranda case. Hence, those sections were inapplicable. Sections S(b)(l)(A)-S(a)(l) were not available to the employee because section S(b)(l)(A) had received a narrow construction in a recent Supreme Court decision and should not be read
broadly.200 Therefore, the Board had no remedial authority over
a breach of the duty, if one existed. Remedy lay, if at all, in the
courts. The dissent also suggested that the duty of fair representation might not protect Lopuch at all. The duty, as understood
by the dissent, protected employees only against actions by the
union based on arbitrary classifications, such as race or union
membership. This case was not based on such a classification, and
involved only a union policy based on length of absence.
Although discussion of all of the implications of the Miranda
decision is beyond the scope of this article,201 several matters do
(1954), for the proposition that the union violated the act when the foreseeable consequence of its actions was to encourage obedience to the union. The dissent believed
that Radio Officers had been modified on that point by Local 357, Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters
v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), which required proof of specific intent to encourage or
discourage unionism. The extended discussion of the significance of § 8(b)(2) and
§ 8(a)(3) in both the majority and dissenting opinions is understandable largely because
of the history of the litigation. See note 197 supra. In earlier phases of the case, when
the NLRB was proceeding on the theory that the violation consisted of giving the
union control as to seniority, the §§ 8(b)(2)-(8)(a)(3) analysis was critical. But in the
instant decision, the crucial issue was not union control but abuse of union power.
The -majority could have rested its decision solely on § B(b)(l)(A) and § B(a)(I) without
recourse to §§ 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3).
The suggestion in some of these cases that the employee "violated" union rules and
was penalized by the union in violation of §§ 7 and B(b)(l) seems only a way station
leading to full development of the duty of fair representation. The union may enforce
against its members those rules which it has adopted through collective bargaining
with the employer. See NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). Therefore the
ultimate question is whether the "rule" enforced by the union was one which it
was entitled, through collective bargaining with the employer, to enforce against the
employee. This question then takes us back to the basic issue of the extent of the duty
of fair representation.
200 The dissent relied on NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), discussed in
note 209 infra.
201 Discussions of NLRB implementation of the duty of fair representation prior
to the Miranda decision may be found in Cox, supra note 191, at 172 [suggesting the
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require examination to obtain a complete perspective on individual rights in the collective bargaining process.
(I) The statutory power of the NLRB to enforce the duty
of fair representation. All five Board members who participated
in the decision of the Miranda case accepted the premise that the
duty of fair representation, implicit in section 9 of the NLRA, is
subsumed to some extent under section 7 and, hence, is enforceable by the Board. The propriety of this basic assumption cannot be determined by reference to the language alone, which
guarantees to employees "the right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing."202
Section 7 was written largely to protect employees' organizational rights, while the problems of the breach of fiduciary duties
often stem from the operational activities of unions once they
have become the established bargaining representatives. 203 The
problem of individual rights in collective bargaining administration is in large measure a result of the success of the national
labor policy in supporting the collective bargaining process. The
NLRB has been the prime instrument of Congress in promoting
this policy. Its charter has been written in broad language to
permit it to come to grips with a variety of attempted limitations
on employee rights. To confine the NLRB to the consideration
of problems explicit at the time of formulation of the national
labor policy would not be consistent with the broad language of
section 7 or with previous decisions of the Supreme Court which
have stressed the breadth of power vested in the Board.204 The
premise of the majority in Miranda seems to flow easily from the
language of section 7 and from the legislative judgment, which
that language expresses, that the Board's power should be adequate for the regulatory needs of the bargaining process.
Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court have rejected
efforts by the NLRB to expand its power into new areas of regulation of labor relations. In all of these cases, the basic reason why
the Court has rebuffed the Board was that the Board's policy
use of § 8(b)(3)]; Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 CoLUM. L. REv. 563, 587-94 (1962) [suggesting the use of §§ 8(b){l) and 8(b){2)].
Section 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
See text at note 71 supra.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 83 Sup. Ct. 1139 (1963); NLRB v. Katz,
369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
202
203
20-1
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was not adequately rooted in the NLRA.205 This cannot be said
of the Miranda decision. Congress has indicated, in section 9(a)
of the NLRA, its concern for individual rights in the administration of the bargaining process, as well as in other related legislation previously discussed. 206 These indications of congressional
concern justify the conclusion that the Board's claim of power
to implement the duty of fair representation is adequately rooted
in the NLRA, and that the courts should uphold the statutory
authority of the NLRB.
The determination of the scope of the duty of fair represen•
tation enforceable by the Board is a separate question. It is pos•
sible to adopt the premise that the duty is implicit in section 7
without resolving the more detailed questions concerning the
scope of the duty. These more detailed issues, as the conflict between the majority and the dissent in Miranda demonstrates, take
two forms:
(a) Is the duty enforceable by the Board limited to cases in
which the union has sought to discriminate against employees on
the basis of union membership? This was the argument of the
dissent. While agreeing that the duty was implicit in section 7,
they contended that it was enforceable by the NLRB only to the
extent that it could be enforced under those sections of the NLRA
which prohibit union-employer discrimination to encourage or
discourage union membership. The dissenters argued persuasively
that these sections are available only if there is some proof that
the purpose of the union-employer action was related to union
membership,207 and also that the evidence fails to establish such
a purpose in Lopuch's case. However, section 7 rights are implemented by sections of the act other than sections 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3).
To argue that the section 7 rights are limited by the enforcement
provisions of section 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) is to allow the remedial tail
to wag the substantive dog. The dissenters recognized t4at they
had to deal with the alternative remedial section, S(b)(l)(A),
which prohibits union "restraint or coercion" of employees in the
exercise of section 7 rights, and 8(a)(l), which prohibits employer
205 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. News
Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 651 (1961); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB
v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
206 See text at notes 136-38 supra.
201 See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
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"interference, restraint or coercion" as to the same matters. The
dissenters, urging a narrow construction of section 8(b)(l)(A),
relied upon the well-known Curtis Brothers-08 decision, an organizational picketing case. This reliance is misplaced. Congress
has indicated its concern for individual rights in collective bargaining, whereas the concern for the unorganized worker expressed by the Board in Curtis Brothers, and rejected by the
Supreme Court, was of the Board's own making. 200 Thus, the
suggested narrow reading of section 8(b)(l)(A) is not persuasive.
There is an additional pragmatic reason for rejecting the
dissenters' contention. If it were adopted, the duty of fair representation would be partially enforceable by the Board, and partially enforceable by the courts. This fragmentization of jurisdiction over the duty would create another jurisdictional puzzle,
similar to those which have plagued labor law for the last decade
or so. These existing puzzles seem close to resolution and there
is no need to embark on another such venture.210
The ultimate weakness of the dissent is that it accepts the
premise that section 7 embraces the duty of fair representation.
Once that has been accepted, the majority view, that the full
scope of the duty is enforceable by the Board through the unfair
labor practice provisions of section 8, seems impervious to the
limiting arguments of the dissenters. Thus, section 8(b)(l)(A),
which prohibits a union from "restraint or coercion," and section
8(a)(l), which prohibits employers from "interference, restraint or
coercion," are available to enforce the full scope of the duty of
fair representation.
(b) Does the duty require the union to protect the contract
rights of employees, or only to refrain from destroying them on
abstract and arbitrary grounds? The majority, as discussed earlier,
NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
In NLRB v. Drivers Union, supra note 208, the Supreme Court rejected efforts
by the Board to use § S(b)(l)(A) to prohibit organizational or recognition picketing.
However, the case is neither dispositive of nor persuasive on the issue involved in
Miranda because the problem of organizational picketing had not been dealt with by the
LMRA, except in § 8(b)(4)(C), but had received significant direct congressional attention
in § 8(b}(7) of the 1959 legislation by the time the Drivers Union case was decided by
the Supreme Court. The Court could quite properly view § S(b)(l)(A) as a part of a
comprehensive network of congressional regulation of organizational picketing after
1959. There is no analogous network of legislation dealing with the duty of fair
representation. Hence, the scope of S(b)(l)(A) may be read differently by the Supreme
Court in the fair representation cases.
210 See Sovern, Section :JOI and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HAR.v. L.
R.Ev. 529 (1963).
208
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considered that the union was obligated to enforce Lopuch's
seniority rights, and that the failure to do so under the facts
of the case violated the duty of fair representation. Presumably,
the majority adopted the distinction between the negotiation of
contracts and their administration, and concluded that in the
latter area the union has a primary obligation to protect the
individual employee's contract rights. The duty of fair representation requires that the union honor, not alter, the employee's
seniority rights. The dissent suggested that the duty protected
employees only against "arbitrary and invidious" discriminations
based on union membership or race. The reduction of Lopuch's
seniority because of his absence from work was a "far cry" from
such discrimination. Thus, the dissent viewed the union's duty
in the administration of the contract as no different from that in its
negotiation, and further suggested that the duty did not extend
beyond the cases of race and union membership. The courts have
interpreted the duty as being much more extensive than this. 211
The importance of the distinction between negotiation and
administration has been discussed earlier. That discussion supports the position of the majority in expanding the union's duty
in administration to provide greater protection for the employee.212
However, the very breadth of the protection offered by the majority poses an additional problem. To determine whether the union
had breached its duty, the Board had to interpret the contract to
determine if Lopuch was entitled to the seniority rights which he
claimed. The contract provided that it was to be interpreted by
an arbitrator, and the arbitration process is itself a favored instrument of the national labor policy. This policy also dictates
that if arbitrators do not interpret contracts, this task rests with
the courts, not the NLRB. Virtually every claim of maladministration of the labor agreement, under the Miranda doctrine, will
involve the interpretation of an agreement. Does this fact lead
toward the conclusion that the functions involved in evaluating
such a claim are those of the court and arbitrator and not those of
the Board? There is precedent for this type of NLRB activity.
The Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices is plenary,213
and contracts have frequently been interpreted by the Board as a
211 See notes 89 and 90 supra, and Ferro v. Rainvay Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d
847 (2d Cir. 1961).
212 See text at note 110 supra.
213 Section lO(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).

1963]

WoRKER-U NION

RELATIONSHIP

1513

part of the process of decision of unfair labor practice cases.214 The
Board, cognizant of a possible overlap in function with arbitration, may defer to the result of arbitration decisions. This, as
will be discussed below, may encourage arbitration. Finally, the
fact that the Board must interpret the contract in order to protect
the employee under the duty of fair representation suggests that
the protection afforded by Miranda will actually be rather narrow,
applying only in those cases where the contract construction proposed by the union and the employer to defeat the employee's claim
is clearly without merit. 215 In doubtful cases, the interpretation
of the parties may stand as a defense to a charge of breach of the
duty of fair representation.
•
The scope of that duty is to be defined initially by the NLRB.
That the Board has the power to define the duty of fair representation broadly has been established; that it had the duty to
define it so broadly remains uncertain. Time, changes in Board
personnel (the decision in Miranda hangs by one vote), experience
with problems as yet not understood, and subsequent decisions of
the Board and the courts of appeals will probably reshape the
issues in Miranda before they are finally resolved by the Supreme
Court.
If the issues reach the Court in the form presented in Miranda,
it would be appropriate for the Court to permit the Board
to embark on the regulation of this aspect of labor relations. It
seems doubtful that the Court can rest at this point and allow
the Board unlimited leeway to define the duty of fair representation. As long as the duty is pressed by the Board to the limits set
by the majority in Miranda, no problem will arise. If the Board
attempts to cut back on the duty announced in Miranda, it will
See, e.g., the discussion in Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).
In Maxam Dayton, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (April 30, 1963), the Board suggested
some qualification on the scope of protection of contract rights guaranteed by Miranda.
There the union had failed, "ineptly" or "negligently," to file a grievance concerning
a discharge within the time limits provided under the contract. The Board refused to
find that this action violated the duty of fair representation. The Board adopted the
trial examiner's statement that "the basis for their discharges was not of such an insubstantial nature as to preclude a good faith belief that they were for just cause."
Evidently the trial examiner believed that the duty applied only to deliberate failures
by the union to press a claim. The evidence supporting the discharge was examined,
but it appears to be of the type normally presented to an arbitrator. It is not clear
that the claim of wrongful discharge was without merit. Obviously, the diminution of
contract rights of the employee is just as great if the union acts negligently as when
it acts deliberately. Query whether the issue of negligence should be projected in this
type of case.
214
215
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force the ultimate issue of individual versus group rights into
the hands of the Supreme Court. My predilections, favoring broad
protection for individual rights in that eventuality, need no repetition at this point.
(2) The desirability of NLRB implementation of the duty of
fair representation. From one interested in maximization of individual rights in the collective bargaining process, the Miranda
case should evoke warm support. There is no doubt that an administrative agency sensitive to the needs of the individual in the
bargaining process will provide more effective guarantees for his
rights than will the judiciary. The concomitants of a~ministration
-the power to investigate, to urge informal settlement and to provide an expeditious hearing, and the expertise of the personnel
involved-all suggest that the NLRB is equipped to handle these
problems more speedily and more fairly than are the courts. This
is true even in light of the great difficulties which the Board has
faced in keeping its dockets anywhere near current. With all of
its overload and backlog, it provides a more effective forum for
solution of these problems than the courts.216 For such reasons,
legal history has seen numerous instances, particularly in this
century, of the replacement of the judicial process by the administrative process.
There is another desirable dimension to the prospect of the
exercise of NLRB power. One problem with the Miranda doctrine
is that it requires the NLRB to interpret the contract in every
case in which the duty of fair representation is allegedly violated.
Contract interpretation lies, by congressional mandate, in the
judicial, rather than in the administrative, domain. 217 Construe216

The time element in some of the cases discussed or cited herein is interesting:
Case
Grievance Date
Disposition Date

Cortez v. Ford Motor Co.,
Nov. 1951
July 1957-Mich. Sup. Ct.
349 Mich. 108, 184
N.W.2d 523 (1957).
Union News Co. v. Hildreth,
March 1958
Nov. 1961-6th Cir.
295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.,
April 1955
May 1963-N.J. Sup. Ct.
40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d
825 (1963).
Conley v. Gibson,
May 1954
Nov. 1958-U.S. Sup. Ct.,
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
D. Tex. dismissed in 1961.
211 H. REP. No. 510 ON H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1947), dealing with LMRA
I 301, permitting suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements to be brought
in federal district courts [see note 101 supra], states: "Once parties have made a col-
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tion of contracts incident to the determination of issues in unfair
labor practice cases is common for the Board, but under Miranda
each case of alleged maladministration would involve such a problem. This argument might operate against recognition of the scope
of the duty of fair representation suggested by the majority in
Miranda were it not for a related Board doctrine, most fully
developed in the Spielberg case.218 In that case, the NLRB attempted to reconcile its duty to prevent unfair labor practices
with the desirability of promoting arbitration. The Board in
Spielberg concluded that, if an issue has been submitted to an
arbitration which was fair and regular, if all parties agreed to be
bound, and if the decision was not clearly repugnant to the act,
the Board will refuse to process an unfair labor practice charge
arising out of the same transaction. The NLRB will defer, as a
matter of policy, to the judgment of the arbitrator, even if it
might have reached a different decision on the same facts. This
doctrine has since been applied in a number of cases, and may
be considered well established, although some details involved
in its application remain unclear. 219
Reading Miranda and Spielberg together, a union and employer would be well advised to submit important questions concerning employment status to arbitration, thereby enabling the
Spielberg doctrine to foreclose the possibility of review created
lective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual
processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board."
Spielberg Mfg. Co., ll2 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
The doctrine was applied in I. Oscherwitz &: Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1961),
deferring to an arbitrator's judgment which upheld a discharge. It was also applied
in Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961), to uphold a decision of
a teamster-trucking association joint-area committee, consisting of an equal number of
union and employer representatives, which did not include an impartial, non-affiliated
"public" member. Such committees are really industry-wide grievance committees. This
decision is questionable, but may be limited to its facts. In General Motors Corp., 132
N.L.R.B. 413 (1961), decided one month before Denver-Chicago, the Board refused to
apply the Spielberg doctrine to the decision of a grievance committee consisting of
union and employer representatives. One ground of distinction was that, "No impartial
arbitrator has ruled in this case."
The Board refused to apply Spielberg in Gateway Transportation Co., 137 N.L.R.B
No. 186 Guly 31, 1962), because of procedural irregularities leading to the arbitration,
including inadequate time for the employee to prepare his defense, refusal of union
counsel to represent him, and refusal of the arbitrator to grant a continuance so that
he might prepare the case. See also Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 84 Gan. 30, 1963);
Precision Fittings, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (April 4, 1963). The doctrine has been
applied only where a matter has been resolved. It has not as yet been extended to a
case where the parties agree to resolve a dispute by arbitration. See Jenkins, The
Impact of Lincoln Mills on the National Labor Relations Board, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
355 (1959).
218
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by Miranda. Thus, one of the principal results of the Miranda
decision should be the submission of more cases concerning individual rights to an arbitrator for an impartial decision. Assuming
that the arbitrators have the courage to act independently in such
cases,220 this is precisely the result which should be encouraged,
both from the standpoint of protection of individual rights and
from the aspect of furthering the use of the arbitration process.
On the other side of the coin are these considerations. The
primary role of the NLRB is to encourage union-management
cooperation. The protection of individual rights stifles such cooperation on some matters. There will be heavy pressures on the
Board to allow union-management agreements to stand, and hence
to narrow the scope of NLRB protection of the right of fair representation. Such a constriction might result from a minor shift
in Board personnel, since Miranda was decided by a bare majority.
However, it is arguable that a narrowly defined duty, administratively enforced, is more desirable than a broadly defined duty,
judicially enforced, and it is possible, in any event, that the Supreme Court will ultimately define the duty broadly.
Secondly, there is a question of allocation of the strained resources of the Board. Many cases arising under the Miranda doctrine will involve intricate questions of contract construction. Is
the Board prepared to process such cases, and, if so, what other
Board functions will be sacrificed? These cases will arise where
collective bargaining has been established. Will the processing
of such cases take administrative energy away from cases where
collective bargaining is still to be achieved? If so, then perhaps
the balance has been improperly struck, for the primary role of
the NLRB remains the encouragement of collective bargaining.
Only one familiar with the pattern of Board operation can answer these questions, but they are important in any attempt to
assess the desirability of the doctrine.
There is an intriguing contrast between the simplicity of the
majority position in Miranda and the almost infinite complexity,
suggested in earlier parts of this article, in the construction of
220 See Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management
Autonomy Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 631, 661-62 (1959); Fleming,
Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN, L.
REV. 235 (1961); Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS,
THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ANNUAL MEETING 1 (McKelvey
ed. 1958).
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theories by which the judiciary can effectively enforce the duty
of fair representation. The courts, less directly involved in the
problems of collective bargaining, would appear to be in a better
position than the Board to protect individual rights. But experience has demonstrated a judicial tendency to defer to almost any
arrangement to which union and management agree, in the interest of promoting collective bargaining at the expense of the rights
of employees. The NLRB has a better idea of the toughness of
the bargaining process and, in this sense, is in a better position to
protect individual employee rights. Yet, NLRB protection rests
on thin, politically charged ground, whereas judicial protection
would seem to rest on a more solid foundation.
If the courts, through lack of understanding of the bargaining
process, are unwilling to protect individual rights despite their
advantages of tradition and lack of involvement, the only recourse
may indeed be to the administrative process. Michael Lopuch may
become one of the first individual employees ever actually protected by an adjudicatory tribunal's application of the duty of
fair representation in the administration of a labor agreement.221
(3) Pre-emption and the duty of fair representation. Under
the doctrine of "pre-emption," developed in picketing cases, if an
activity is "arguably" subject to the National Labor Relations Act,
whether protected or prohibited, the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction.222
The principle of exclusive NLRB jurisdiction is based upon
two factors: (a) In 1947, when Congress added restraints on
unions to the existing restraints on employers, it adopted a comprehensive code of substantive law relating to labor relations.
Rights under that code were immune from state restraint and
obligations under that code were enforceable by the NLRB. The
comprehensive regulation foreclosed the application of potentially
221 The application of the duty of fair representation to the administration of the
labor agreement was announced in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), which set aside
the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. On remand, the case was dismissed on procedural
grounds. 49 L.R.R.M. 2635 (S.D. Tex. 1961). The opinion on dismissal indicates that
the ultimate complaint of employees was that they were excluded from the union
because of their race. The Court held that this was not actionable. See Blumrosen,
Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 21 (1961).
222 Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962); In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Delony, State Power To Regulate
Labor-Management Relations, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAlloR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959 (Slovenko ed. 1960). See McCoid, Notes on a "G-String": A
Study of the "No-Man's Land" of Labor Law, 44 MINN. L. REV. 205 (1959).
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conflicting substantive law.223 (b) Congress consciously placed
administration of this code in the NLRB, thus evidencing a
preference for the federal administrative enforcement of the code,
to the exclusion of any other method of enforcement.224
These considerations led the Court to develop the principle
that courts, state and federal, must defer, in labor relations matters, to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRB. The
scope of this preclusion of judicial action has not been clearly
defined. In cases involving violence, the Court has refused to
infer congressional intent to deprive the states of power to act. 225
In some instances, Congress has explicitly preserved the judicial
power. These include the enforcement of collective bargaining
contracts,226 the awarding of damages for illegal secondary boycott,227 and the protection of rights of union members under Title
I of the LMRDA.228 Before the passage of the LMRDA, the Supreme Court allowed a state cause of action for wrongful expulsion and loss of employment opportunities against a claim that
the union action might violate section 8(b)(2) and, therefore, fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
223 Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1953): "The detailed pre•
scription of a procedure for restraint of specified types of picketing would seem to
imply that other picketing is to be free of other methods and sources of restraint. For
the policy of the National Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all
picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by
freedom of labor to use the weapon of picketing."
224 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959): "['I']he unifying
consideration of our decisions has been regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted
administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency,
armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and
cumulative experience:
" 'Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by
any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide
primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted
tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice,
and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order.
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed
procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to
avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures
and attitudes towards labor controversies.••• A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity
of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as
are different rules of substantive law••• .' Gamer v. Teamsters Union 346 U.S. 485,
490-491.'' Id. at 242-43.
225 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
226 LMRA § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
221 LMRA § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. IV, 1963).
228 LMRDA §· 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67, as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60 (Supp. IV, 1963).
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In allowing the state to process a member's action against his
union for breach of the membership ·contract, the Supreme Court,
in Gonzales v. International Ass'n of Machinists, concluded that
the union activity involved was a "merely peripheral concern"
of the LMRA.220
Since, in Gonzales, the union interfered with employment opportunities, its action could be characterized as a breach of the
duty of fair representation. Under Miranda, it would be subject
to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Miranda thus makes the reasoning in the Gonzales case obsolete. After Miranda, the reasoning
of the pre-emption cases requires that judicial actions to enforce
the duty of fair representation be dismissed in deference to the
primary original jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Without passing on the Miranda doctrine, the Supreme Court
in the spring of 1963 clearly indicated that actions to enforce the
duty of fair representation are pre-empted by the LMRA. In Local
100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden,230 the Court held
that state power was pre-empted wherever the crux of the action
by an employee against his union was interference with the
220 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), as explained
in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).
In Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 83 Sup. Ct. 1423 (1963) and
Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 83 Sup. Ct. 1429 (1963), the Supreme
Court narrowed the scope of the Gonzales case by holding that, where the "crux" of the
employer's action against his union was interference with his employment relation, the
judicial power was pre-empted by the LMRA. Neither Borden nor Perko was based on
the theory that the union had violated its duty as a bargaining agent toward the plaintiffs. Both cases could have been so argued, because plaintiffs were members of a union
which used its collective bargaining power to damage their employment opportunities.
In both the Supreme Court held that the union activity was arguably protected or
prohibited by the LMRA and hence, under the Garmon decision, was not subject to
state court jurisdiction. The Court made footnote reference to the Miranda case, but
did not discuss iL If Miranda is upheld, Perko and Borden suggest that state (and federal)
judicial jurisdiction over actions against a union for breach of the fiduciary duty may be
foreclosed. Under Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, these actions apparently may be maintained if they are cast in pure contractual terms. But such a conclusion would make a
plaintiff's rights to judicial protection against breach of fiduciary duty depend on the
skill of the pleader. If the issue of contract construction which, under Smith, is open to
judicial consideration depends upon a balancing of conflicting values of union freedom
to bargain away employee claims and individual rights to enforce the benefits of
collective bargaining contracts, and if the NLRB has been given the primary function
of striking that balance, it is doubtful whether there is justification for leaving the
matter in the hands of the courts. The potential conflict between Smith and BordenPerko will probably plague us for some time to come.
230 83 Sup. Ct. 1423 (1963). In a companion case, Local 207, Int'! Ass'n of Bridge
Workers v. Perko, 83 Sup. Ct. 1429 (1963), the Court held that actions by supervisors
were also pre-empted since they might fall within .the range of NLRB power. See note
191 supra for a discussion of earlier decisions on pre-emption.
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employee's present or potential employment relations. In such
cases, union conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by the
LMRA and is beyond the reach of state power.
In Borden the employee charged that a union business agent
willfully refused to allow him to accept work to which he was
entitled under union rules relating to the operation of hiring halls.
Since hiring hall rules are necessarily involved in the contractual
relation between union and employer,231 the case raises virtually
the same problem as did Miranda, i.e., union refusal to permit
the plaintiff to obtain the benefit of contractual provisions with
the employer which govern his employment opportunities. Thus
the case would have been tried on the theory that the union
breached its duty of fair representation to the employee in the
administration of the hiring hall rules. But this argument was not
made. Instead, the employee's action was pleaded in "tort" for
willful interference with the right to pursue a lawful calling, and
(in an obvious effort to invoke the Gonzales decision) in "contract"
for violation of a promise implicit in the membership arrangement
not to discriminate against members unfairly.
The Supreme Court was unimpressed. "It is not the label
affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the
determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction. Rather ... 'our concern is with delimiting the areas of
conduct which must be free from state regulation if national
policy is to be left unhampered.' ... In the present case the conduct
on which the suit is centered, whether described in terms of tort
or contract, is conduct whose lawfulness could initially be judged
only by the federal agency vested with exclusive primary jurisdiction to apply federal standards."232
This approach would be equally applicable to a complaint
denominated "action for breach of the statutory duty of fair
representation.'' The crux of actions for breach of the duty of
fair representation is always interference with the employee's
present or potential employment relations. Under the reasoning
of Borden the actions can no longer be processed in the courts
without going through the original primary jurisdiction of the
NLRB.
However, this does not mean that states have no power over
231
232

See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
83 Sup. Ct. at 1428.
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such actions. It means only that they cannot exercise any power
until the Board has decided how far it will press the Miranda
principle, and the courts have passed on the Miranda doctrine.
One of the issues which split the majority and dissent in Miranda
was whether the Board should remedy all breaches of the duty of
fair representation, or only those based on race or union membership. If the view of the majority prevails and all breaches of the
duty are to be remedied by the Board, then the pre-emption doctrine would be fully applicable. Union conduct which violated the
duty would be subject to remedy by the Board. Union action in
compliance with the duty would be protected against judicial
interference. But if the dissenting view prevailed, and the Board
implements only one aspect of the duty, that relating to race and
union membership, then the courts would retain jurisdiction
over other facets of the duty of fair representation. Otherwise, a
new "no-man's land" would be opened in labor relations, in connection with this duty, where the Board would not and, under
Borden, the states could not act.233 But Congress, in adopting
section 14(c) of the NLRA in 1959, made it clear that this was not
to happen. 234 If the Board will not act in the area, the courts are
free to do so. The avoidance of this jurisdictional morass is another
reason suporting the majority view in Miranda, albeit one which
became apparent only in light of the post-Miranda decision in
Borden.
The path of protection for individual rights in the collective
bargaining process seems inevitably strewn with legal refinements.
The contract-tort analytical problems and remedial difficulties
plague the courts; internal disputes divide the Labor Board;
jurisdictional disputes threaten to paralyze action on the merits
of an employee's claim.
The thrust of the pre-emption doctrine will place the solution
of these problems within the range of NLRB power. Acting under
See Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
Section 14(c)(2) provides: "Nothing in this act shall be deemed to prevent or bar
any agency or the courts of any state or territory • • • from assuming and asserting
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines ••• to assert jurisdiction."
See Blumrosen, The New Federalism in Labor Law, in SYMPOSWM ON THE LABORMANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Ac:r OF 1959 (Slovenko ed. 1960). State courts•
jurisdiction to enforfe the federal duty of fair representation implies the presence of
federal court jurisdiction as well under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958). See Syres v. Oil Workers
l!50 U.S. 892 (1955). A contrary opinion, clearly erroneous, was expressed in GIBA
International Union of Elec. Workers, 50 L.R.R.M. 2299 (D. Conn. 1962).
233
284

v:
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a broadly written charter, the Board is in a position to make the
appropriate value judgments balancing the interests of employees
and the union-management parties to the collective bargaining
relation. If this opportunity is accepted by the Board, many of the
problems previously discussed by this article will have been
avoided. For example, the suggestion that contracts should be construed to permit individual actions under LMRA, section 301, if the
union breached its fiduciary duty was designed to protect the individual. Such a construction might be unnecessary if the protection
is forthcoming from the Board. Similarly, the argument that section
9(a) allows individual enforcement of grievance and arbitration
provisions would lose much of its force. The analysis of section
10l(a)(5) of the LMRDA which finds union "discipline,, in any
case where the employee breached the duty of fair representation
could be dismissed ~f that duty was fully protected by the Board.
If the narrower view of the NLRB's power to enforce the duty
prevails, the courts will be free to use the available legal tools,
section 301 of the LMRA and section 10l(a)(5) of the LMRDA,
to protect individual rights in the collective bargaining process.235
The Miranda decision seems to provide the best hope in years
for the protection of individual rights to fair representation by
the union. Until the Supreme Court has passed on the issues in
the Miranda case, however, the existence of Board power, and its
scope, will not be clear. To protect against the risk of losing
a fair representation case for failure to choose the proper forum,
counsel for the employee, besides requiring the exhaustion of all
contract and internal union remedies, should institute suit under
the Steele doctrine and direct the filing of charges with the
NLRB. Only in this way can employee rights be preserved during
the unfolding stages of this newest development.
In summary, the protection of individual rights in the collective bargaining context lags far behind the protection of the individual in his other relations with the union. During the past year,
decisions in the Miranda and Donnelly cases have demonstrated
increasing judicial and administrative concern for the rights of
employees in the administration of the collective bargaining relationship. But these decisions have created many unanswered ques2a5 Cf. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Lodge 12, Int'! Ass'n of
Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880
(1958).
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tions, which makes the search for meaningful individual rights
difficult indeed. The Supreme Court, which has announced the
duty of fair representation, has not developed that duty in sufficient detail to provide guidance to the lower courts or administrative agencies. The courts have been reluctant to protect the
individual, and it may be that individual rights will fare better
before the NLRB. It is now uncertain whether such protection
will come from the courts, or the NLRB, or from both.
Obviously, major problems in our rapidly changing economic
system, created by automation, business reorganization, the demands of national defense, and the international situation, all of
which impinge on the employment relation, ·cannot be solved
by providing individual protection in the collective bargaining
context. But by providing such protection, the law may help to
shape the appropriate roles of labor, management and government so that, in the handling of these broad problems, individuals
will be protected to the maximum extent possible.236
IV.

CONCLUSION

"The fullness of life must be found in the nature of work itself." Daniel Bell
(1961).287

The legal profession is probably more cognizant of the importance of protecting individual freedoms than any other group
in our society. Union and management counsel are in a position
to advise their clients on decisions which will affect individual employee freedoms. Yet, the organizational objectives of union and
management may appear to be better served by minimizing individual employee freedoms. Thus, counsel in labor relations may
face a conflict between their obligations toward their clients and
toward the larger social interests which they serve by virtue of
their professional capacity.238 The situation has its brighter side,
236 In Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 83 Sup. Ct. 1158 (1963), Mr. Justice
Brennan, while developing rules to protect the dissenter within the union from an
objectionable use of dues for political purposes, urged the unions to devise appropriate
internal procedures and formulas to accomplish the same result without litigation.
237 BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 392 (Collier rev. ed. 1961).
238 See Guzzo v. United Steelworkers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2379 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1960),
cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Superior Court of State of California, 365 U.S. 802 (1961).
In his address at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, NLRB
Chairman McCulloch said: "[T]here are still some employers and unions • • • who
deliberately flout the law which has been on the books for many years, and then utilize
the appellate processes of our Board and the Courts to delay its application and enforcement." McCulloch, A Tale of Two Cities: or Law in Action, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
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however. Counsel, as he directs and advises his institutional client,
may channel the institution's efforts and desires in directions
which will reinforce, rather than subordinate, individual freedoms. This challenge to the lawyer, who makes law informally
as he advises his client, calls for the highest qualities of the profession. Most labor relations matters of importance involve the
advice of counsel at some critical stage. The legal profession has
an opportunity to help establish the conditions of individual
freedom. It may be that employee rights can be made meaningful
only as counsel for union and management work conscientiously
toward this end.
This possibility is dramatically illustrated in a situation described recently by a respected attorney who represents management in labor matters. He was negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement between a union and a medium-sized firm. As negotiations neared their conclusion, the parties were a few thousand
dollars apart, a small sum considering the total amounts involved.
At this point, the union representative called counsel for the
employer to the side and proposed this arrangement: if the employer yielded to the union's economic demands, the union would
not later object to the dismissal of employees A and B who were
"troublemakers" for both union and management. The savings
in wages resulting from the dismissal would just about equal the
difference which then existed between union and management.
Counsel for management made the following assumptions as
he evaluated the proposal: (1) the employer's competitive position was such that he would probably accept the offer; (2) the
subsequent discharge of the employees would be done in such a
way that they could have no recourse to the legal system; (3) this
discharge could not be accomplished without union acquiescence
in a contract violation; and (4) the union proposal was in violation of its fiduciary duty to employees A and B.
How does his sense of professional responsibilty bear on the
question of whether he should accept or reject the proposal, and,
in either case, communicate or not communicate the existence of
the proposal to the employer?
The same type of illustration could be duplicated by union
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW 14, 24 (1962). This suggests that
the question of professional responsibility of the attorney is closely related to the
effective application of law to labor relations problems.
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counsel. For example, counsel has persuaded at least one Teamsters' local to arbitrate any discharge case in which the employee
is dissatisfied, whether or not the union believes the employee is
correct.
In the day-to-day world of the legal adviser, such opportunities
to promote or minimize individual employee rights are not uncommon. Whether such opportunities are seized is a significant
test of professionalism in this branch of the law. Undoubtedly a
factor in the decision of counsel is the clarity of the rules of law
relating to the union's duty to the employee. If the rule of law
clearly protects the employee, counsel on either the union or
management side are more likely to guide their clients along
paths which protect individual freedom. If the rule of law does
not clearly protect the employee, counsel may find it more difficult
to afford him protection. This is a factor which should be considered carefully when developing the rules of law which fix the
relationship between union and employee. The effect of the
Hildreth decision, which sanctioned discharge of an employee
without proof of wrongdoing, may be to reduce the likelihood
that counsel will advise union and management against irrationally discharging an employee. Conversely, the Miranda decision
may encourage counsel to submit doubtful cases to the impartial
judgment of an arbitrator.
The rules of law relating the individual to the union must
reflect the preferences of the policy makers, whether they are
legislators, administrators, or judges. These preferences for the
protection of individual rights have been made clear in the
political area and in connection with internal union affairs. A
similar development has not yet taken place, although it may be
under way, in the area of collective bargaining.
In defining the duty of fair representation to maximize individual rights, and then by implementing that duty in day-to-day
advisory functions, the legal profession can play an important role
in determining the emphasis which will be placed on individual
freedoms in the organized society into which we are moving. The
organization of the world which Mr. Justice Holmes saw in 1896
is proceeding at a rapid pace. This organizing process creates the
risk of uniformity and the reduction of the area of individual
freedom. Perhaps diversity and freedom are inconsistent with the
organization of society. Uniformity may be a necessary conse-
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quence of increasing complexity. But this has yet to be established.
It may be possible in a highly organized society to have either
uniformity or diversity; freedom or conformity. This issue may
not be foreclosed by the external forces operating on our socialeconomic system, but may be one in which man's judgment and
political sense, expressed through law, can play a significant
role. 239 This assumption, an aspect of the "robust common
sense"240 of the law, underlies efforts to promote individual freedom within the organized society.
239 See Woodward, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from , Laissez-Faire
to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962).
240 "Till now the law has been guided by a robust common sense which assumes
the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of its problems." Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).

